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A RIGHT TO LEGAL AID: THE ABA MODEL 
ACCESS ACT IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
James R. Maxeiner* 
ABSTRACT 
For over two centuries America has failed to fulfill its 
promise to bring justice to all. Although the United States was 
among the first of nations to proclaim access to justice for the poor, 
it is among the last of modern nations to try to provide it. 
Sometimes, it seems, Americans have forgotten their promise. 
Maybe they have given up. In August 2010 the American Bar 
Association moved to revive the nation's forgotten promise. It 
proposed the ABA Model Access Act. The Act would sidestep 
Supreme Court decisions that deny a constitutional right to civil 
legal aid and create a modest statutory one. It would recognize 
that legal aid in civil litigation is not charity, but a right that is an 
essential part of a rule-of-law state. The Act is a framework law 
and leaves details to be filled in by enacting bodies and by 
institutions charged with implementing it. This article examines 
the ABA Act in international perspective to inform future 
enactments. It suggests that meaningful legal aid requires legal 
reform generally. 
INTRODUCTION 
Equal justice under law is a credo of American law so firmly 
* © 2011 James R. Maxeiner, J.D. Cornell, LL.M. Georgetown, Ph.D. in law (Dr. jur.), 
Ludwig Maximilian University (Munich, Germany). Associate Professor of Law and 
Associate Director, Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Bal· 
timore School of Law. This article was written with the support of a summer research 
stipend of the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
61 
62 A Right to Legal Aid [Vol. 13 
held that it is carved into the frieze above the main entrance to the 
building of the United States Supreme Court.l Justice is not equal 
if it is denied to those who cannot afford to purchase it. 2 
In 1776 America's founders declared in state declarations of 
rights that everyone "ought to have justice and right, freely 
without sale, fully without any denial.. .. "3 In articles known as 
"open courts" clauses they set a goal of justice-for all-not just for 
those who could pay for it.4 They proclaimed this gospel to the 
world. In 1792, Joel Barlow, a confidant of Thomas Paine in 
London and Paris, and soon American plenipotentiary to Algiers, 
Tunis and Tripoli, lectured European rulers that Americans 
sought courts "equally open to the poor as to the rich."5 Barlow 
admonished them that for states "to hinder [any man] from 
bringing [a lawsuit] that is just, is a crime of the state against 
him."6 Yet the poor did not always have access to American courts 
1. The Maryland Access to Justice Commission uses a beautiful color picture of the 
frieze as the cover of its Fall 2009 INTERIM REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS. It is freely 
rendered on the cover of HARRISON TwEED, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY NEW YORK CITY 
1876 - 1951 (The Legal Aid Soc'y ed. 1954). The entrance was recently closed out of 
security concerns. See Adam Liptak, Step Away from the Courthouse Doors, N.Y. 
TIMES, MAy 4,2010, at A15. 
2. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) ("There can be no equal justice 
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Plurality 
opinion by Black, J.) 
3. See, e.g., EDWARD C. PAPENFUSE & GREGORY A. STIVERSON, THE DECISIVE BLOW 
IS STRUCK, A FACSIMILE EDITION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
CONVENTION OF 1776 AND THE FIRST MARYLAND CONSTITUTION (1977). Many states 
include such provisions in their state constitutions. See Daniel W. Halston, The Mean-
ing of the Massachusetts 'Open Courts' Clause and Its Relevance to the Current Court 
Crisis, 88 MAsS. L. REV. 122 (2004); Jonathan M Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: 
The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279 
(1995); Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to Un-
derstand the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005, 1006 (2001). 
The ABA prefers the more modern-and more international-term "access to justice." 
4.Id. 
5. JOEL BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS: IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF 
EUROPE, RESULTING FROM THE NECESSITY AND PROPRIETY OF A GENERAL REVOLUTION 
IN THE PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNMENT, PART I, 133 (3rd ed. 1793, 1st ed. 1792). According 
to his biographer, "during the last half of 1793 Barlow supplanted Thomas Paine as 
the leading Republican author writing in English." RICHARD BUEL, JR. & JOEL 
BARLOW: AMERICAN CITIZEN IN A REVOLUTIONARY WORLD 171 (2011). 
6. Buel & Barlow, supra note 5, at 159. 
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then 7 and they do not have it now. 
Today Europe is more than a century ahead of America in 
achieving equal access to courts. Already in 1892, one hundred 
years after Barlow wrote, and the year that America's school 
children began to recite a pledge of allegiance to their flag ending 
with a call for "liberty and justice for all,"8 a poor American in 
Paris could count on access to courts in France, but not at home.9 
Nearly two hundred years after Barlow chided Europeans that 
Americans protected all litigants and Europeans did not, the 
United States Supreme Court denied that the U.S. Constitution's 
guarantee of due process includes civil litigation aid, while the 
European Court of Human Rights held that the European 
Convention of Human Rights Article 6 guarantee of a fair trial 
does include a right to such aid. 10 Today, forty-five member states 
of the Council of Europe, including twenty states formerly under 
Communist rule,l1 do what no one of the fifty United States of 
7. See Note of the Editor, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOEL BARLOW 98, 99-100 
(Mott & Lyon ed. 1796) ("Let us not delude the world, by impressing an opinion, that 
we have arrived at the summit of perfection in government and laws, - when so many 
glaring evils are profusely scattered around, - when the law's delay - the expense of 
justice - and the insolence of office, are as much to be complained of, in most of the 
American States, as under the much execrated systems of Europe."). 
8. The Pledge of Allegiance, 4 U.S.C. § 4. First published in THE YOUTH'S 
COMPANION, September 8, 1892. 
9. D. Chauncey Brewer, The Status of Indigent Americans in French Courts, 26 AM. 
L. REV. 540 (1892). See also Convention du 17 juillet 1905 relative it la procedure ci-
vile, arts. 20-24 [Convention on civil procedure concluded 17 July 1905], available at 
http://www.hcch.netlindex_en.php?act=text.display&tid=16, superseded by the Con-
vention on Civil Procedure concluded 1 March 1954, arts. 20·24, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=33 (providing for nation-
al treatment in availability of legal aid). 
10. Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join Step 
with the Rest of the Developed World, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS L. REV. 769 (2006). See 
also EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (CEPEJ), EUROPEAN 
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS EDITION 2010 (DATA 2008) 49-82 (2010) [hereinafter CEPEJ): 
EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY OF JUSTICE (2010); EUROpAISCHE KOMMISSION, LEITFADEN 
DER BERATUNGS- UND PROZEBKOSTENHILFE 1M EUROpAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSRAUM 
(1996); STUDY ON THE TRANSPARENCY OF COSTS OF CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION - FINAL REPORT 228-283 (Contract JLS/2006/C4/007-30-CE-
0097604100-36 for the Commission Europeenne - DG for Justice, Freedom and Securi-
ty, 2007) available at https:lle-justice.europa.eulhome.do?plang=en&action=home. 
11. Notwithstanding the decision of the European Court of Justice, two Council of 
Europe states, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, have yet to implement a right to legal aid in 
civil litigation. CEPEJ, supra note 10, at 50. 
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America does: guarantee access to civil justice. 12 
Maybe-just maybe-some American states will catch up 
with their European counterparts. In 2010 the American Bar 
Association ("ABA") proposed the ABA Model Access Act. 13 
Adoption of that Act would make legal aid a right rather than 
charity in cases where "basic human needs" are at stake. 
This article VIews the ABA Model Access Act III 
international-particularly German-perspective. Part I 
summarizes the Act. It shows that the Act is intentionally 
incomplete and requires supplementation. Part II examines legal 
aid in America as' Europeans might view it. Part III summarizes 
the German system of litigation aid and shows ways in which 
German experiences might inform adoption and implementation of 
the American Model Act. Part IV provides an historical 
explanation for the differences between German and American 
approaches. The Conclusion raises the question of whether 
effective legal aid is possible without substantial legal reform. 
I. LEGAL AID UNDER THE ABA MODEL ACCESS ACT 
The ABA Model Access Act would change legal aid but 
would not alter the litigation system. 14 It would give some indigent 
persons a right to some legal aid in some litigated cases. 15 It would 
12. See id. at 50, 296. 
13. This is not the fIrst time that the ABA has acted in the area, but there have not 
been many others. See Part III infra. Recently, interest in legal aid has increased. In 
2006, the American Bar Association House of Delegates unanimously "RESOLVED, 
that the American Bar Association urges federal, state, and territorial governments to 
provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low· income persons in 
those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, 
such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as deter· 
mined by each jurisdiction." Resolution 112A passed the August 7, 2006. In the wake 
of the worst recession in decades, in 2009 the United States Department of Justice 
created an "Access to Justice Initiative." See http://www.justice.gov/atj! (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2011). At least thirteen states have recently taken action to improve access to 
justice. See AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS ET AL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, R-105 REVISED, at 1-7 
(August 2010) [hereinafter REPORT]. The Report proposed and the House of Dele-
gates adopted the ABA Basic Principles for a Right to Counsel in Civil Legal Proceed-
ings. 
14. See Part I(C) infra. 
15. See Part I(A)(2) infra. 
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create a new institution-a "State Access Board"-to design, build, 
and administer a new system. The board in each state would 
promulgate procedures to determine claims for legal aid. 16 
The Model Act is not a complete system of legal aid. It is "a 
starting point to turn commitment into action;" it provides "the 
means to introduce the concept and begin discussions ... that will 
lead to implementation of a statutory right to counsel."17 It 
presents legislators with choices. It compels administrators to 
create implementing regulations and policies. 
The Model Act assumes, but does not require, that legal aid 
will be provided by salaried lawyers employed by legal aid 
organizations. 18 Historically, the United States has relied on this 
approach. The Model Act does not, however, preclude using 
ordinary lawyers compensated from public funds. I9 Historically, 
Germany and other countries have used this approach20 
In Part I, I point out those choices. I discuss the right itself, 
in Subpart A, the State Access Board in Subpart B, and the choices 
the legislature or the Board will need to make to set up a 
functioning system of legal aid in Subpart C. 
A. THE RIGHT TO LEGAL AID 
The most important innovation of the ABA Model Access Act 
is to make access to justice in some civil cases a matter of right 
and not of charity.21 Legislative adoption would recognize that the 
right to be heard in court should not be conditioned on paying 
court costs or attorneys' fees. 22 It would overturn judicial rejection 
16. See Part I(B) infra. 
17. REPORT, supra note 13, at 6. 
18. See Part I(C)(2) infra. 
19. This latter approach sometimes is referred to as "judicare." See E. Clinton Bam-
berger, Jr., The American Approach: Public Funding, Law Reform and Staff Attorneys, 
10 CORNELL Im'L L.J. 207, 210-11 (1976). 
20. See Part JII(B) infra. 
21. Id. 
22. It would parallel a similar legislative recognition that the right to be heard in 
elections should not be conditioned on ability to pay a poll tax. U.S. CaNST. amend. 
XXIV. Only later did the Supreme Court reverse earlier precedent and secure a right 
to vote free of costs. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), over-
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of such a right. 23 
1. BASIS FOR THE RIGHT 
The Model Act declares that "[f]air and equal access to 
justice is a fundamental right in a democratic society."24 The 
drafters quote U.S. Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, who 
told the American Bar Association: "Equality before the law in a 
true democracy is a matter of right. It cannot be a matter of 
charity or of favor or of grace or of discretion."25 
The drafters of the Model Act justify their declaration of 
right with arguments of equal justice and of the rule of the law. 
They find an "impossibility of delivering justice rather than 
injustice in many cases unless both sides, not just those who can 
afford it, are represented by lawyers."26 Moreover, equal justice 
under law, they say, "forms the foundation of America's social 
contract with all its citizens."27 
Elsewhere, one of the Model Act's drafters, Justice Earl 
Johnson, Jr., explains the social contract argument. In the social 
contract, he writes, individuals give up their natural right to self-
help and bestow on the state a monopoly of force. In return they 
receIve a promIse of equal administration of justice. 28 If 
ruling Breedlove v Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
23. The courts have largely ignored the states' open courts clauses. They have rec-
ognized in the federal due process clauses rights of access only with respect to "fun-
damental constitutional rights." See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 676 (7th ed. 2004) ("Where access to the judicial process is not 
essential to the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights the state will be free to 
allocate access to the judicial machinery on any system or classification which is not 
totally arbitrary.") 
24. AM. BAR ASS'N WORKING GROUP ON CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, A.B.A. REPORT TO 
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2011). Cf., Roger C. Cramton, An International Compari-
son of Legal Services for the Poor, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 205 (1977) (noting "[t]he idea 
that everyone in society, without regard to station or resources, should have access to 
the institutions of justice is inherent in the liberty, equality, and due process that the 
new nation was created to protect and advance"). 
25. REPORT, supra note 13, at 9. 
26. Charity, they report, "has proven woefully inadequate." Id. 
27.Id. 
28. Earl Johnson, Jr., Equality before the law and the social contract: When will the 
United States finally guarantee its people the equality before the law the social contract 
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administration of justice depends on a party's wealth, justice is not 
equal, the social contract is broken, and the affected party ought 
not be condemned if he or she resorts to self-help.29 
By statute the Model Act would realize what is known as 
"civil Gideon," that is, a right to state assistance in civil cases. In 
1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright 30 the U.S. Supreme Court found a 
constitutional right to state-provided counsel in criminal cases. 
But in 1981 in Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servo of Durham 
County,31 the Court denied such a right in civil cases generally. In 
Lassiter it allowed for the possibility of a right to state provided 
counsel in civil cases where personal liberty is at stake. In Turner 
V. Rogers in 2011, however, it rejected that claim in a case of one-
year imprisonment for civil contempt of court. 32 The ABA Model 
Access Act would, in effect, overturn Lassiter and Turner by 
creating a limited statutory right to legal aid in some civil cases. 
2. SCOPE OF THE RIGHT 
The Model Act does not create a comprehensive right to 
legal aid. It would be, the drafters say, a "beginning."33 Besides 
eligibility requirements and limits on assistance, it has two 
particularly important limitations. First, the Act provides that the 
right to assistance applies only when "basic human needs" are at 
stake. Second, it covers only litigation and not counseling. 
Basic human needs. The Model Act recognizes a right to 
demands?, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 159-160 (2010); Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gide-
on's Trumpet Sound a New Melody? The Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its 
Implications for a Right to Equal Justice in Civil Cases, 2(1) SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. 
JUST. 201, 205 (2003). 
29.Id. To the same effect in Germany, see ZIVILPROZEB UND PRAXIS: DAS 
VERFAHRENSRECHT ALS GRUNDLAGE JURISTISCHER TATIGKEIT, FESTSCHRIFT FUR 
EGON SCHNEIDER ZUR VOLLENDUNG DES 70. LEBENSJAHRE 267 (1997) (citing Peter 
Philippi, ProzefJkostenhilfe und Grundgesetz); VICTOR SCHNEIDER, INT'L LAW ASS'N, 
REPORT OF THE TwENTY-THIRD CONFERENCE, 184, 186 (1907); Linde, Beitrag zur 
Lehre iiber das Armenrecht im Prozesse, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR CIVILRECHT UND PROZEB 
57, 66 (1828). 
30. 372 U.S. 375 (1963). 
31. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
32. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
33. REPORT, supra note 13, at 9. 
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legal aid in cases in which "basic human needs ... are at stake."34 It 
defines basic human needs to be "shelter, sustenance, safety, 
health and child custody."35 Although the listing of five needs 
seems intended to be exhaustive, the Commentary invites 
adopting jurisdictions "to make modifications, based on the unique 
circumstances applicable to their communities."36 
Unless modified, the Act would deny legal aid in cases 
concerning paternity,37 most contract cases (e.g., for sales of goods, 
for education), most tort cases (including liability claims for past 
personal injury), most property cases unrelated to shelter (e.g., 
condemnation of property not providing shelter), marital status 
cases not related to child custody, inheritance cases, taxation 
cases, and civil forfeitures. 38 
Litigation but not counseling. Members of the drafting 
committee considered extending a right to legal aid to counseling 
as well as to litigation. 39 One, Justice Johnson, published a draft 
"State Equal Justice Act" that jurisdictions considering the Model 
Act should consider. 40 
With respect to litigation, the Model Act provides for aid 
largely without regard to forum. It makes public legal services 
available at state expense "in any adversarial proceeding in a state 
trial or appellate court, a state administrative proceeding, or an 
arbitration hearing .... "41 It does, however, exclude mediation42 and 
litigation in federal courts. 43 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 2. 
36. Id. at 3. 
37. See Commentary to SECTION 2. 
38. Id. (defining basic human needs). 
39. See generally REPORT, supra note 13. 
40. See Appendix to Johnson, Equality before the Law, supra note 28, at 222. 
41. REPORT, supra note 13, at 4. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 8. The basis for this exclusion is not apparent. It might be, among other 
imaginable reasons, additional expense, deference to the federal system, preference for 
state systems, or a desire not to encourage federal public interest litigation. 
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B. THE STATE ACCESS BOARD 
The ABA Model Access Act establishes within the state 
judicial system an "independent State Access Board ("Board") with 
responsibility for policy-making and overall administration" of the 
legal aid program. 44 It empowers the Board "to promulgate 
regulations and policies .... "45 The Board is to "[e]nsure that all 
eligible persons receive appropriate public legal services when 
needed .... "46 It is to oversee the State Access Fund created to pay 
for legal aid. 47 The Board has wide-ranging authority to create a 
unique system of legal aid. 
Although the Model Act prescribes an independent board 
within the state's judiciary system, the Commentary to Section 4 
acknowledges that that may be too cumbersome or too expensive 
for smaller states. 48 It suggests that they consider assigning the 
Board's responsibilities to an entirely independent entity, to the 
state bar association, to the state court system or to the executive 
branch. 49 In any case, however, the Model Act provides that a 
majority of Board members will be lawyers. 50 
C. FUTURE AMERICAN LEGAL AID SYSTEMS 
The Model Act leaves to State Access Boards critical design 
decisions with respect to eligibility, certifying organizations, and 
procedures determining eligibility. It thereby practically assures 
that there will be substantial variations in legal aid systems from 
state to state. 
1. ELIGIBILITY 
The Model Act imposes two prerequisites for granting legal 
aid: economic need and case merit. It creates special rules for 
appeals. 
44. Id. at § 4.A. 
45. Id. at § 4.D. 
46. Id. at § 4.E.i. 
47. Id. at § 4.E.iv. 
48. REPORT, supra note 13, at § 4. cmt. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at §4.B. 
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Economic need. The Model Act limits assistance to people 
"who are unable to afford adequate legal assistance." It leaves to 
the State Access Boards determination of what that means. 51 It 
anticipates that annual income will be the principal variable and 
the federal poverty definition the principal standard. It prescribes 
that aid ordinarily should be granted where "household income 
falls at or below [125 percent] of the federal poverty level."52 
The Model Act excludes from eligibility applicants in three 
circumstances where legal aid is deemed unnecessary: (1) 
proceedings where lawyers are not allowed (e.g., in some states, 
small claims courts); (2) proceedings where applicants are already 
receiving legal representation through existing civil legal aid 
programs, contingent fee, insurance or class action representation; 
and (3) proceedings that are uncontested, unless there is a finding 
that the interests of justice require representation. 53 
Case merit. If the person seeking legal aid is a plaintiff, the 
Model Act authorizes "full public legal representation" only if the 
potential plaintiff has "a reasonable possibility of achieving a 
successful outcome."54 On the other hand, if the person seeking 
legal aid is a defendant, the Act authorizes representation only if 
the defendant has "a non-frivolous defense."55 The Model Act does 
not define a "successful outcome." Is a case successful if it results 
in a judgment against a person who cannot pay? Is it successful if 
a person of sufficient means would throw the claim away because 
the probable recovery is inadequate to justify the costs? Is it 
successful if it settles for nuisance value? The Model Act leaves 
these questions to be answered by the State Access Board policies 
and regulations. 
Appeals. The Model Act reqUIres parties to make new 
51. Id. at § 3.D. 
52. Id. The Commentary to Section 3 suggests that implementing jurisdictions 
might consider a higher threshold, such as 150 percent, or a formula that takes into 
account other factors relevant to ability to pay, such as applicant's assets, which make 
some applicants more able to pay, or extraordinary ongoing expenses which make oth· 
er applicants less able to pay. 
53. Id. at § 3.B.iii.a.-c. 
54. Id. at § 3.B.i. 
55.Id. 
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applications on appeal and applies certain standards. 56 If the party 
seeking assistance won in the first instance, full assistance is 
available on appeal "unless there is no reasonable possibility that 
the appellate court will affirm the decision of the trial court .... "57 
In these instances, the Board will take into account whether the 
applicant had the benefit of counsel during the development of the 
record up for review. 58 On the other hand, if the party seeking aid 
lost in the first instance and seeks to overturn the lower court 
decision, the Act applies two different standards depending upon 
the nature of the relief sought. In ordinary cases, full assistance is 
available only if the party seeking support shows "a reasonable 
probability of success .... "59 In other cases, however, where the 
appellant is seeking a change in law, legal aid is to be granted 
"when there is a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, 
or reversing existing law or for establishing new law."60 Although 
this provision tracks the language of Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (which relates to filing papers in first 
instance), it is sure to draw objection from critics who complain 
that legal aid is used to change law. 61 They may rightly ask, why 
should appeals seeking a change in the law be subject to a more 
lenient standard than appeals seeking to apply the law as it is? 
2. CERTIFYING ORGANIZATIONS 
The Model Act directs the State Access Board to "establish, 
certify, and retain specific organizations to make eligibility 
determinations,"62 yet the Act does not restrict the Board in its 
choice of certifying organizations. In particular, it does not require 
that certifying organizations be independent of legal services 
providers. 63 Consequently, when certifying organizations are 




60. Id. at § 3.B.ii. See also REPORT, supra note 13, at 7. 
61. Compare id., with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). The Model Act does not include a par· 
allel provision for granting aid in the first instance based on a law-changing com-
plaint. 
62. Id. at § 4.E.ii. 
63.Id. 
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themselves providers, their certifying decisions may be challenged 
as self-serving. Parties opposed to extending aid may claim that 
the certifying organization in granting aid is just drumming up 
business for itself, while parties denied aid may object that the 
certifying organization is just conserving its resources for itself. 
The Model Act does not anticipate that the courts hearing 
legal aid cases will routinely determine eligibility. 64 It does, 
however, authorize judges exceptionally to make their own 
assessments that unrepresented litigants require public legal 
representation. If a judge notifies the Board that such 
representation is necessary, the Board's role is limited to 
confirming that a basic human need is at stake and that the 
potential recipient meets economic needs criteria. 65 The Board is 
not to decide whether the case has legal merit. 66 
The Model Act does not say what the Board should look for 
in choosing organizations to make eligibility determinations. 67 The 
Commentary to Section 4 suggests that the legislature should be 
sure to authorize the Board to appoint local legal aid 
organizations, including both federally and state-funded 
organizations, as well as any self-help centers that the state court 
system certifies as qualified. 68 
The Model Act does not say how the Board should allocate 
responsibilities among certifying organizations. Should it give each 
exclusive competency for a specific geographic territory or for a 
specific subject matter area? Should it permit applicants to choose 
among certifying organizations? Should it permit applicants to 
apply to more than one certifying organization, either concurrently 
or consecutively? What should be the effect of one certifying 
organization turning down an application on a later application 
with another certifying organization? 
64.Id. 
65. REPORT, supra note 13, at § 3. cmt. 
66.Id. 
67. Id. at § 4.E.ii. 
68. REPORT, supra note 13, at § 4. cmt. 
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3. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY 
The Model Act provides general instruction on granting aid. 
It states that "initial determinations of eligibility for services may 
be based on facial review of the application for assistance or the 
pleadings."69 It does not prescribe important details such as: (a) 
the content of the application; (b) who else (e.g., the State Access 
Board, the State Fund, the other party in the litigation, the court 
in the litigation), if anyone, is to receive notice of the application 
and is to be heard in the consideration of the application; (c) 
whether an oral hearing is required; (d) whether the body 
authorized to decide is to assist the applicant with the application 
or is to question the application's content; and (e) what form the 
decision is to take (e.g., oral, written with reasons). 70 
Review of legal aid decisions. The Model Act anticipates that 
"any initial finding of eligibility is subject to a further review after 
a full investigation of the case has been completed,"71 yet the Act 
makes no provision for such a full investigation. It says nothing 
more about modification or withdrawal of aid, i.e., what would 
trigger it, when it would be conducted, by whom or how, or with 
what consequences. 
The Model Act directs that the Board shall "establish and 
administer a system that timely considers and decides appeals by 
applicants found ineligible for legal representation at public 
expense, or from decisions to provide only limited scope 
representation."72 It provides no further direction. It does not 
provide for review of decisions to grant legal aid (such as might 
interest the funding authority or the adversary party). 
D. POLICY DECISIONS LEFT TO THE STATE ACCESS BOARD 
The State Access Board must make several important policy 
decisions left unanswered in the Model Act: how much legal aid is 
enough, what kinds of litigation legal aid may be used for, and 
69. Id. at §3.B.i. 
70.Id. 
71. Id. at §3.B.i. 
72. REPORT, supra note 13, at § 4.E.iii. 
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what kinds of lawyers-private practitioners or legal aid 
organization lawyers-should provide representation. 
1. How MUCH LEGAL AID IS ENOUGH? 
In many cases civil litigation for sums under $100,000 is 
economically untenable. 73 That amount is twice the U.S. median 
family income. In such cases parties who have to bear their own 
lawyers' fees, often do not even bother bringing lawsuits. If they do 
sue, they may eschew use of expensive discovery procedures. Most 
commonly, if they sue, they settle before trial with the costs of trial 
as much in mind as the rights of their claims. They must shepherd 
their funds. Should legal aid recipients be better off than non-
recipients?74 
The Model Act gives only a few hints as to how much legal 
aid parties in such cases should get. It provides for such assistance 
"as necessary for the person to obtain fair and equal access to 
justice."75 It anticipates levels of assistance ranging from "full 
legal representation," through "limited scope representation," 
down to "self-help assistance" (for pro se litigants). 76 
Determination of what is sufficient is left to the decision of the 
administrators of the program based on criteria set forth in the 
Model Act and in implementing regulations and policies. To 
conserve resources, the lesser levels are to be preferred whenever 
sufficient to ensure that basic human needs are not jeopardized. If, 
however, the other side in the dispute is represented by a lawyer,' 
the limitation to "limited scope representation" is not to apply.77 
The Model Act leaves unanswered just what these concepts 
mean. Section 2C defines "full legal representation" to be "the 
73. See JAMES R. MAXEINER, ET AL., FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2011); James R. Maxeiner, The American "Rule':' As-
suring the Lion His Share, COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Mathias Reimann ed. 2011) (explaining why many American 
lawsuits are economically untenable). 
74. Cr. Turner v. Rogers, at 14 (noting the "asymmetry" that might result where one 
side has court-appointed counsel and the other does not). 
75. REPORT, supra note 13, at § 3.A. 
76. The first two are defined in §§ 2 and 3.A. The third is undefined. 
77. Id. at § 3.B.iii. 
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performance by a licensed legal professional of all legal services 
that may be involved."78 Does that permit a legal aid lawyer to 
invest without limit in discovery, expert witnesses or other 
ancillary services in the case?"79 
The question of extent of representation is a potential time-
bomb that could undermine granting legal aid to the poor. If both 
sides have modest resources, but only one has unlimited legal aid, 
the aided party will have unfair advantage such as legal aid is 
intended to avoid. 80 Critics of legal aid may seize on those 
advantages to challenge its very existence. Even where that 
question is not present, how much legal aid is given will directly 
impact the amounts of money needed to pay for legal aid 
representation. 
We surmise that the Model Act does not deal with this issue 
because its drafters anticipated that the organizations that 
provide the legal aid would make these decisions, much as they 
often do today. The new system needs to address this concern. On 
the one hand, if legal aid is a right, and not charity, then the 
providing organizations no longer will have the freedom to 
determine the extent of representation themselves. Will a recipient 
be able to require trial?81 On the other hand, addressing the issue 
is a prerequisite to establishing a system based on regular lawyer 
representation. 
The Model Act opens the door to a reorientation of legal aid 
in America from a focus on providing counsel to a focus on access 
to justice. Providing counsel often may be a more expensive form of 
legal assistance. Other forms of assistance might be more effective. 
These might include partial assistance with counsel fees. or 
78. Id. at § 2.C. 
79. The spirit of the Model Act anticipates that the state will cover at least some an-
cillary services when it says that the right to public legal services includes "translation 
or other incidental services essential to achieving this goal [of fair and equal access to 
justice)." Id. at § 3A 
80. This was an issue for legal aid in Germany in its early days nearly two centuries 
ago. See Linde, supra note 29. 
81. Ct. James Gordley, The Meaning of Equal Access to Legal Services, 10 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 220, 223 (1977) ("The staff attorney ... can be given a measure of discretion 
in rationing aid among potential recipients which no private lawyer is in a position to 
exercise. "). 
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making court procedures more receptive to pro se representation. 
The end result could be to provide access to justice to a larger 
universe of recipients. 82 
2. SHOULD LEGAL AID EXTEND TO LAWSUITS 
SEEKING CHANGES IN LAW? 
Another political time bomb is whether the right to legal aid 
will include a right to pursue instrumental goals of creating law 
and asserting public law rights. Seeking change in the law was one 
goal of the legal aid movement of the 1970s.83 It was a "missionary 
effort."84 The outcome of litigation was and sometimes still is 
intended to affect more than just those parties immediately before 
the court. Those parties immediately before the court, who in 
ordinary cases would control the litigation, may have a merely 
nominal role. Others behind them may control the case. How 
should this affect how much legal aid the nominal parties receive, 
if any? Such use of legal aid funds has been at the heart of 
controversy over the funding of the federal Legal Services 
Corporation since the 1970s.85 
3. WHO SHOULD PROVIDE LEGAL AID: PRIVATE ATTORNEYS OR 
LEGAL AID STAFF LAWYERS? 
The Model Act, according to the Commentary to Section 4, 
would permit Boards "to contract with local non-profit legal aid 
organizations or with private attorneys, or both, as it deems 
appropriate .... "86 Although the Act does not explicitly state who 
will provide services, it seems to anticipate that services will be 
provided through bulk arrangements, i.e., through legal aid 
organizations and contract attorneys engaged III multiple 
82. Although in Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), the Court did not speak in 
terms of levels of legal assistance, or in terms of modification of the concept of court-
provided counsel, it did take a step in that direction, when it looked for a more general 
assessment of whether the indigent litigant received "substitute procedural safe-
guards." 
83. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 19, at 209-10; Gordley, supra note 81, at 226. 
84. Id. at 230. 
85. See Quintin Johnstone, Law and Policy Issues Concerning the Provision of Ade-
quate Legal Services for the Poor, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 571, 579-591 (2011). 
86. Id. 
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representations. It is loosely enough drafted, however, to permit 
mechanisms that would allow applicants to choose their own 
lawyers. 
II. AMERICAN LEGAL AID FROM A FOREIGN 
PERSPECTIVE 
Americans have grown so accustomed to not providing legal 
aid to the disadvantaged, that many no longer question the 
injustices that it produces. 87 Whereas once America led the world 
in providing justice to its people, today it lags badly. To state that 
in traditional academic terms fails to convey adequately how 
retrograde we are. We resort here to a different technique used for 
more than four centuries: a dialogue between a common lawyer 
(here an American common lawyer) and a European civil lawyer. 88 
When an American lawyer tells a European lawyer there is 
no right to legal aid in the United States, he is likely to get much 
the same response as he might get if he were to tell her that we 




Surely, you must be kidding. This IS the 21st 
century, not the 18th. 
No. It's true. 
NO RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES TO 
LEGAL AID 
You don't have anything like Article 47(3) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union? It states: "Legal aid shall be made 
available to those who lack sufficient resources in 
so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective 
87. C{. infra discussion part IV.A.2. 
88. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SAINT GERMAN, THE DIALOGES IN ENGLlSHE BETWEENE A 
DOCTOR OF DIUINITIE AND A STUDENT IN THE LAWES OF ENGLANDE, NEWELY 
CORRECTED AND IMPRINTED WYTH NEW ADDICIONS (1575), SAINT GERMAN'S DOCTOR 
AND STUDENT: EDITED FOR THE SELDEN SOCIETY BY T.F.T. PLUCKNETT AND J.L. 
BARTON (Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, J.L. Barton eds., 1974); RUDOLF B. 
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXTS-MATERIALS 201 (2nd ed. 1959; 7th 
ed. 2009); Myron Moskowitz, The O.J. Inquisition: An American Encounter with Can· 
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access to justice."89 
Nope. 
[Vol. 13 
Don't you have a guarantee of a right to a fair 
trial? Article 6 of our European Human Rights 
Convention-now sixty years old and applicable 
from Iberia to Siberia and not just in the European 
Union-provides that "[i]n the determination of 
his civil rights and obligations... , everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing .... "90 It was 
not a big leap to read that as meaning that legal 
aid must be provided when necessary to a fair 
hearing. 
Oh, yes. Day in court is what the public talks 
about. Lawyers call it due process. We guarantee 
due process. Everyone gets to have a lawyer. 
OK. Everyone gets a lawyer, even if he can't afford 
one? 
Oh. No. Somebody has to pay the lawyer. If you 
can't pay, maybe a friend will. 
I guess common law countries don't get it. In 1979 
the European Court of Human Rights had to tell 
Ireland that that it must provide legal aid in civil 
cases. 91 
We get it. Our Supreme Court has held that the 
state must provide legal aid in a civil case where 
the defendant's custody is at stake. 
Huh? You mean, if you wind up in prison? We are 
not talking about criminal cases. 
Yes. Custody can occur: prison or perhaps an 
asylum. If custody is not at stake, there is no right 
to counsel. But there is a right to defend yourself 
pro se. I hear that in some places, like in Germany, 
you must have a lawyer. 
That's right. In Germany, if the case involves more 
than £5,000, you have to have a lawyer. It makes 
89. 2010 O.J. (C 83) 2. 
90. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
November 4, 1950, 213 V.N.T.S. 222. art. 6, § 1. 
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proceedings run more smoothly and protects 
parties' rights 
And if you cannot afford a lawyer, you lose? 
No. You can pick your own lawyer; legal aid pays 
the lawyer and over the following 48 months you 
repay the lawyer what the court determines you 
are able to pay and anything more the state 
covers. Of course, if you win the case, the losing 
party pays it all. 
LEGAL AID AS PILLAR OF THE RULE OF 
LAW 
That's practically socialism, or at least some of my 
more conservative friends would say so. We 
Americans don't go for the "social" market 
economy that you Europeans like so much. 
Are you kidding? It's not charity. Legal aid in 
litigation is more than just social help. Many 
places without social market economies have legal 
aid for litigation. Why, France and Germany had 
litigation aid a century before they had social 
market economies. Litigation aid is a pillar of the 
rule of law. It is about your right to be heard~ i.e., 
what you Americans call your 'day in court.' 
Without legal aid, many people cannot be heard. 
What do you mean? 
Because we have civil procedure, we prohibit self-
help. If you think you are right, if the other party 
does not freely concede that, you go to court. You 
don't go over to his house and beat him up until he 
pays. That's what civilized society is about. 
OK. We have courts for that purpose, too. The 
aggrieved go there. 
And if they have no money? 
They could have a problem. 
Doesn't that mean you have one law for the rich 
and another for the poor. What became of equal 
justice under law? 92 
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APOLOGIES FOR THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 
It's not such a big problem. Litigation is only part 
of the law. It protects against the government. If 
the government were to try to take away my right 
to free speech, you can be sure that I would get 
help from the American Civil Liberties Union or 
someone like that. Were the government to try to 
take down my advertising billboard, somebody like 
the American Enterprise Institute would help me. 
In either case, the news media, on the left or on 
the right, would bring my case to the attention of 
the country. I do not worry. My rights are 
protected. 
What if it's not a political issue or particularly 
interesting for the media? What if it is an issue 
between private parties? 
It's still not a big problem. If the claim is small-
typically under $5,000-1 can go to small claims 
court without a lawyer. If it is strong case and 
big-over $100,000, or better over $1 million-I 
can get a "plaintiffs lawyer" who will represent me 
without charge and will take the fee from the 
winnings. If it is a claim that many people have, I 
can get a "class action" lawyer to take the case for 
all of us. 
And if the claim is not small enough for small 
claims court and not big enough for a contingent 
fee and not repetitive enough for class action, are 
you out ofluck? 
By no means. I can ask a legal aid society or a law 
school clinic to help me out. 
Will they help you? 
Honestly?-probably not. They have more pressing 
matters. They help first people with basic human 
needs, like their jobs, or their homes or their 
family rights. 
Bill of Rights might just as well have read: "Every subject who can furnish a bond for 
fliteen or seventy-five dollars ought to obtain justice freely, completely, and without 
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Then you have lost your day-in-court, and with it, 
your case, haven't you? 
No. I can still represent myself. 
OK. But you are a lawyer and a well-educated 
person at that. Fine help a right of self-
representation is for anyone else. Do you mean to 
tell me that in your adversary system, where the 
judge is passive, someone without a lawyer has a 
chance against someone with a good lawyer? 
Of course not. In the United States we say-only 
partly in jest-that the party with the better 
lawyer ought to win. Chances for someone without 
lawyer are not good. But we are working on 
making help available so people can represent 
themselves better. That is a part of the ABA Model 
Access Act. Moreover, if the Act is adopted, if the 
case involves a "basic human need," then the 
litigant will get not just assistance in self-
representation, but full representation. 
So if I get cancer and I can't afford a surgeon and a 
hospital, you would teach me how to operate on 
myself at home? You would give me a surgeon and 
an operating room only if it is a life-threatening 
condition?" 
Now come on: let's not go off the deep end. Law is 
not like health. We all know that there are a lot of 
legal rights that you can't enforce in court. 
Lawsuits are expensive matters: most people 
cannot afford them for most matters. Think of 
most cases as cosmetic surgery. Do you really need 
a court to decide the case? 
So some rights are not really rights to be enforced? 
So some people should not go to court to get their 
rights? 
Get real. No legal system is perfect. Ours is about 
as good as they get. We Americans are legal 
realists: just because some rights are not worth 
enforcing, does not mean our legal system is a 
failure. How is it any different for you? 
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This is what makes the American discussion about 
legal aid perplexing to us Europeans. A right to 
legal aid in litigation is nothing new: original 
member states of the European Union have had it 
for well over a century. The aristocratic regime 
bestowed it; we did not need a social market 
economy to get it. Not all 47 member states of the 
Council of Europe-I won't name names, are 
known for their records for supporting human 
rights or social rights-but they have legal aid for 
litigation. Legal aid is nothing new or 
extraordinary; it is routine. Some five to ten 
percent of cases have legal aid. How can you get 
along without a right to legal aid? 
We do. 
Look. Doesn't the United States pay attention to 
its own international agreements? The 
International Declaration of Human Rights in 
Article 10 provides that "[e]veryone is entitled in 
full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and. impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of his rights and obligations .... " 
That's the declaration that Eleanor Roosevelt 
sponsored. 93 Each year your Department of State 
reports on how well other countries have lived up 
to it. It may be time for you to do some self-
reporting. 
Maybe we should. 
The United States led the world in realizing 
rights. What happened? When I read your 
declarations of rights, when I read your early 
writers on administration of justice, I feel at home. 
I feel we share values. But when I hear you talk 
about how things work-or do not work-in the 
United States, I shake my head in disbelief. What 
is the explanation?" 
We just happen to have on our faculty someone 
93. See generally MARy ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 
AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). 
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who knows about comparative law in historical 
perspective. I will ask him to give an explanation. 
He tells me, in brief, the reason is that in the 
United States the private bar controls the civil 
justice system. Legal aid is not high in its list of 
priorities. 
III. LEGAL AID IN GERMANY 
A. "THE LAw IS THERE FOR EVERYBODY" 
Legal aid in Germany is an everyday part of the legal 
system. The Ministry of Justice of the state of North Rhine 
Westphalia explains matter-of-factly to potential recipients: "The 
law is there for everybody.94 All people are equal before the law. 
Article 3 of our constitution says so. Therefore, no one should be 
forced by financial considerations to give up enforcement of her 
rights. Legal aid for both counseling and litigation is there to 
accomplish this."95 
The Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 made legal aid available 
nationally shortly after German unification in 1871. The Code and 
its system of legal aid remain in effect today as amended. 96 The 
principal changes in legal aid since 1877 have been in the funding 
basis (no longer is it based on mandatory pro bono representation) 
and in scope (it now extends to counseling as well as litigation). 
The latter was added in 1980 in a new "Law Concerning Legal 
94. See NORTH RHINE WESTPHALIA MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, DAS RECHTS 1ST FUR ALLE 
DA [The law is there for all] (2005), available at https://services.nordrhein westfa-
lendirekt.delbroschuerenservice/downloadll05lDasRechtistfueralleda.pdf. 
95. JUSTIZMINISTERIUM DES LANDES NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN, WAS 8IE DBER 
BERATUNGS- UND PROZESSKOSTENHILFE WISSEN SOLLTEN [NORTH RHINE WESTPHALIA 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT COUNSELING AND LITIGATION 
ASSISTANCE] 2 (2008), available at https:llservices.nordrheinwestfalendirekt.de 
Ibroschuerenservice/downloadl16/prozesskostenhilfe.pdf ("Das Recht ist fUr aile da. 
AIle Menschen sind vor dem Gesetz gleich. So bestimmt es Artikel 3 unseres 
Grundgesetzes. Niemand soil deshalb aus finanziellen Grunden gezwungen sein, auf 
die Wahrnehmung seiner Rechte zu verzichten. Urn dies zu erreichen, gibt es die 
Beratungshilfe und die Prozesskostenhilfe." 
96. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] as amended through 24 September 2009. 
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Counseling and Representation for Citizens with Low Incomes"97 
and was accompanied by amendments to the legal aid provisions of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. We refer here collectively to these 
changes as the 1980 Reform Law. 
Legal aid is a potential part of every lawsuit. It is available 
to everyone who might need assistance. It is not restricted to 
paupers. In one recent year, in the ordinary courts of first 
instance, depending on the court, one or more parties sought legal 
aid in seven to nine percent of cases. In family law matters legal 
aid involvement exceeded forty percent of cases. 98 
The right to legal aid is a general one, unlimited by type of 
claim, claimant, or court. 99 
Legal aid is not limited to just some types of claims, such as 
the "basic human needs" limitation of the proposed ABA Model 
Access Act. 
Legal aid is not limited to certain types of claimants. It 
extends to legal persons, which by definition, cannot have basic 
human needs.l0o It extends to immigrants 101 and to prisoners, 102 
97. See Gesetz uber Rechtsberatung und Vertretung fUr BUrger mit geringem 
Einkommen von 18. Juni 1980, BGBl I, at 689 [BerHG] [Law on Counseling and Rep. 
resentation of Citizens with Limited Incomes of June 18, 1980]. 
98. PETER GOTTWALD, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT BEGRUNDET VON LEO ROSENBERG 
FORTGEFUHRT VON KARL· HEINZ SCHWAB 464·65 (17th ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
GOTTWALD]. The figures are from 2007, where it was seven percent in the small claims 
courts of limited jurisdiction (Amtsgerichte) and nine percent in the courts of general 
jurisdiction (Landgerichte). Only in the latter courts is there is an obligation to use a 
lawyer. An earlier edition of the same text reported that in 1971, before the reforms, 
five percent of plaintiffs in the Amtsgerichte and seven percent of plan tiffs in the 
Landgerichte received legal aid. KARL HEINZ SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 
BEGRUNDET VON LEO ROSENBERG 459 (12th ed. 1977). 
99. See generally SCHOREIT/GROB, infra note 104, at 123·25. 
100. § 116 ZPO. 
101. In the Code of 1877 foreigners had a right to legal aid only if their home states 
extended legal aid to Germans. 
102. A particularly infamous inmate, Magnus Giifgen, whose crime resembled that 
of the defendants in the famous American Leopold·Loeb murder case, was held enti· 
tled to legal aid to seek compensation for the conditions of his arrest and interroga· 
tion. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 19, 
2008, 1 BvR 1807/07, available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheid 
ungenlrk20080219_1bvr180707.html. 
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both of whom are often excluded in the United States from federal 
funding of legal aid. 103 
Legal aid is available in all German courts, including the 
ordinary courts, the constitutional courts, the administrative 
courts, the labor law courts, the social courts, the patent court and 
the tax courts. 104 Legal aid is not, however, available in extra-
judicial arbitration or mediation. 105 In this respect, the ABA Model 
Access Act is more progressive; it makes legal aid available in 
arbitration and thus recognizes the contemporary importance of 
alternative dispute resolution. 106 
B. LEGAL AID IS INTEGRATED INTO THE COST SYSTEM 
Legal aid in Germany is integrated into the cost system. 107 
It requires no separate institutions. The courts determine 
applications for legal aid for litigants who appear before them. 108 
103. REBEKAH DILLER AND EMILY SAVNER, A CALL TO END FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS 
ON LEGAL AID FOR THE POOR 11·12 (2009) available at http://www.brennacenter.org 
Ipagel·/J ustice/LSCRestrictions WhitePa per. pdf. 
104. ELMAR KALTHOENER, HELMUT BUTTNER & HILDEGARD WROBEL· SACHS, 
PROZESS· UND VERFAHRENSKOSTENHILFE; BERATUNGSHILFE 4, 9-10 (5th ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter KALTHOENER); ARMIN SCHOREIT & INGO MICHAEL GROB 
BERATUNGSHILFE PROZESSKOSTENHILFE VERFAHRENSKOSTENHILFE 
BERH/PKHNKH § 114, 12-125 (10th ed. 2010) [hereinafter SCHOREIT/GROBj. There 
are separate provisions for criminal defendants. Non-defendant participants in crimj-
nal cases may be entitled to legal aid. 
105. KALTHOENER, supra note 104, at 6; SCHOREIT/GROB, supra note 104, § 114, at 
124 (noting that where arbitration or mediation are conducted by the courts them· 
selves, then legal aid is available). 
106. See SECTION 3.A. 
107. The Code Of Civil Procedure treats costs, security for litigation and litigation 
assistance in three successive titles; §§ 91-127a. ZPO. 
108. The drafters of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 considered assigning the 
decision to grant aid to an independent body along the lines of the bureau d'assistance 
in France. They rejected that possibility because they saw it as too close to th.e admin-
istration of justice to entrust to a lesser authority wh.ose decisions might not receive 
popular confidence. ENTWURF EINER DEUTSCHEN CIVILPROZEIlORDNUNG NEBST 
BEGRUNDUNG: 1M KONIGLICHEN PREUI3ISCHE JUSTIZ-MINISTERIUM bearbeitet 289 
(1871); see also NICOLO TROCKER, EMPFEHLEN SICH 1M INTERESSE EINER 
EFFEKTIVEREN RECHTSVERWIRKLICHUNG FUR ALLE BURGER ANDERUNGEN DES 
SYSTEMS DES KOSTEN- UND GEBUHRENRECHTS?, GUTACHTEN B FUR DEN 51. 
DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG B7, at B11 (1976). Accordingly, they directed it to the 
courts. They were not concerned about possible prejudice of the court deciding the pe· 
tition, because their original proposal did not have a case merit test; the legislature 
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Ordinary lawyers provide representation. 109 
Legal aid in Germany does not ordinarily provide legal 
representation. llo Instead, it adjusts the law of costs and security 
to facilitate access to justice.l11 This means that legal aid 
recipients are not restricted to a "poor man's lawyer."1l2 They may 
choose the lawyers they wish to represent them. 1l3 
When a person consults a lawyer for the first time, if there 
is indication of financial need, the lawyer is obligated to mention 
legal aid. 114 If legal aid is indicated, in the ordinary course the 
lawyer files application for legal aid on behalf of the client and 
indicates that the lawyer is the person's. choice as lawyer. 1l5 The 
lawyer may make application before the action is brought, or as 
part of the initiation of the suit. 116 Commonly the lawyer bases the 
added such a test later. 
Apparently in practice the possibility of prejudice was not as great as the drafters of 
the 1877 Code had feared. In 1961 a law review commission revisited the issue. It con· 
sidered two possible remedies: (1) establishing an independent authority to decide the 
issue; or (2) assigning a different judge to the case in the event that the reviewing 
judge denied the application for legal aid. The commission, however, thought that 
change was not necessary; experience had shown that judges deciding applications for 
legal aid did not lose their objectivity in further conduct of the case. BERICHT DER 
KOMMISSION ZUR VORBEREITUNG EINER REFORM DER ZIVILGERICHTSBARKEIT. 
HERAUSGEGEBEN YOM BUNDESJUSTIZMINISTERIUM 270·71 (1961). 
By assigning the task to the court where the lawsuit is to be brought, both conflicts of 
interest and legal aid forum shopping are avoided. The possibility that the providers of 
legal aid would themselves make the decision, as is allowed under the ABA Model Ac-
cess Act, does not seem to have been seriously discussed. 
109. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The German Alternative: A Legal Aid System of 
Equal Access to the Private Attorney, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 213 (1977). 
110. Id. at 215. 
111. See §§ 122·123 ZPO. 
112. Schlesinger, supra, not 109 at 217. 
113. Id. 
114. KALTHOENER, supra note 104, at 50·51; EGON SCHNEIDER, DIE KLAGE 1M 
ZIVILPROZESS: TAKTIK-PRAXIS-MuSTER 9-10,185-88 (2000). 
115. SCHNEIDER, supra note 114, at 188·90. Lawyers are not required to take clients 
under legal aid, but most do. Parties who wish to have legal aid authorized before vis· 
iting a lawyer may do so. They go to the clerk's office of the local court of limited juris· 
diction (the Amtsgericht). They can give their applications orally to the clerks, who 
record them. § 117(1) ZPO. Clerks assist those parties who need help in making appli-
cation. 
116. Schlesinger, supra note 109, at 214. 
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application on a draft complaint. If the court grants legal aid, the 
lawyer represents the person under the terms of the legal aid 
law.!17 If the court denies legal aid, the disappointed applicant 
must decide whether to go ahead with the lawsuit without legal 
aid. 
If legal aid is granted, the representing lawyer is paid by the 
state, and has a direct claim against the state, but at a rate below 
the ordinary statutory rate.l18 The court determines what fees 
probably will be before deciding the application. In the German 
system, it can do that with precision. Fees are regulated by law 
and are based on amounts in dispute. 119 If legal aid is granted, the 
legal aid recipient is required to make forty-eight equal monthly 
co-payments to the state toward those amounts due. 120 The court 
determines the amount of the monthly co-payment by the fees to 
be incurred and ability to pay.l21 Recipients' obligations to make 
co-payments cease when the total of all their payments made 
equals the liability for costs and fees, or after they have made 48 
co-payments, whichever comes first.!22 
Loser pays and legal aid. A court's decision to grant legal aid 
does not alter the general rule of German law that losers pay 
statutory costs and lawyers' fees of winners. 123 Accordingly, legal 
aid recipients who lose their cases must pay these expenses 
without aid. Moreover, they must pay judgments rendered against 
them. These litigation risks discourage suits by potential legal aid 
recipients. Nevertheless, proposals that legal aid should cover 
117. § 121(1) ZPO. For simple matters where £5000 or less is at stake, a lawyer may 
not be needed. But if one is, the court must appoint the applicant's choice. § 121(2) 
ZPO. 
118. Schlesinger, supra note 109, at 214. For example, if the amount in controversy 
is €5,000 (about $7000), each fee unit is €219 instead of €301. Compare Rechtsan-
waltsvergiitungsgesetz [RVG] [Lawyers' Compensation Law], as amended to May 23, 
2011, BGBl I at 898, § 49 (legal aid rate), with RVG § 13(1) and Anlage 2 [Annex 2] 
(normal rate, the Annex giving the rate in tabular form), available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.defbundesrecht/rvgfgesamt.pdf'. A typical case might 
have two to five fee units. 
119. RVG, supra note 118, §2. 
120. Id. at § 115(2). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at § 123. 
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recipients' adversary attorneys' fees have not been adopted.124 
The risks of loser fee-shifting are not as high in Germany as 
they would be in the United States. German statutory fees for both 
sides combined are typically less than legal fees for one side alone 
in the United States. 125 The litigation risk in Germany has the 
salutary effect of discouraging frivolous lawsuits. 
The ordinary rule of loser pays indirectly supports German 
legal aid. The loser pays rules are altered to make special 
accommodations for legal aid cases. First, they provide that the 
lawyer for the winning party has a direct claim against the losing 
party.126 The usual rule gives only the winning party that claim. 
Second, the claim against the losing party is not for the reduced 
legal aid rate, but for the full statutory fee. 127 This difference can 
be substantial for middle-to-high value claims. 128 The result is, in 
effect, a modified contingent fee system for legal aid cases. 
c. GERMAN SYSTEM OF LEGAL AID 
1. ELIGIBILITY 
Although legal aid is routine in Germany, courts do not 
decide whether a party is entitled to legal aid unless asked. 129 It is 
up to each party wishing for legal aid to apply for it. Not every 
party qualifies. 130 As has been proposed in the ABA Model Access 
Act, to obtain legal aid in Germany requires proof of economic need 
and of case merit. 131 There is separate consideration of appeals. 132 
124. GOTTWALD, supra note 98, at 477, margin No. 73. 
125. See MAXEINER ET. AL., supra note 73, at 241-45. 
126. § 126(1) ZPO. 
127. Schlesinger, supra note 109, at 216; SCHOREIT/GROB, supra note 104, at 270. 
128. § 126(1) ZPO. The victorious aided-party's claim is not, however, lost. 
SCHOREIT/GROB, supra note 104, at 271 (with further references). In the absence of 
legal aid, only the victorious party and not that party's lawyer, has a claim against the 
loser. In the American system, if the legal aid lawyer has received federal funding, the 
lawyer is prohibited from seeking fees from the opposing party. 
129. Schlesinger, supra note 105, at 213-14. 
130.Id. 
131. Id. 
132. § 119 ZPO. 
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Economic need. The present formulation of economic need 
has been in effect for 30 years; it was adopted by the 1980 Reform. 
Its predecessor had been in effect for over one hundred years; it 
was part of the original Code of Civil Procedure of 1877.133 The two 
formulations are similar. 
Both the 1980 test and the 1877 test before it moved the law 
in the same direction: from considering legal aid as charity to 
seeing it as an essential element of legal process and as a legal 
right for recipients. 134 Both expanded the circle of assisted persons 
by making the need criterion more dependent on individual 
circumstances of particular applicants in specific cases and less on 
wealth. While individualizing the criterion for eligibility, both 
statutes made standards more objective and increased the role of 
independent judges in applying them. Both increased the 
responsibility of recipients to contribute to their own aid. 
Since the 1980 Reform, the Code of Civil Procedure has 
provided that a party135 has a right to legal aid if "according to her 
personal and economic circumstances she cannot meet the costs of 
the litigation or only in part or in installments."136 The costs 
referred to are the party's own upfront expenses in prosecuting the 
action, i.e., court costs, lawyer's fees and expenses of taking 
testimony (e.g., advances for experts and other witnesses). 137 They 
do not include expenses that the party might have to pay, e.g., 
enforcing a judgment, taking or contesting an appeal, or paying 
the costs, fees and expenses of the other side should the assisted 
party lose the case. 
Legal aid is available to the public at large. Poverty is not 
133. Mauro Cappelletti & James Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Varia· 
tions: Part One: The Emergence of a Modern Theme, 24 STAN. L. REV. 347, 356 (1972). 
134.Id. 
135. Other persons involved in the case who are not formally parties may be entitled 
to legal aid under another law governing legal aid for counseling. 2 STEIN/JONAS, 
KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, § 114 II 2. a), 716·17, margin No. 3·4 (22nd 
ed. 2004) [hereinafter STEIN/JONAS]. 
136. "[D]ie nach ihren personlichen und wirtschaftlichen VerhiHtnissen die Kosten 
der Proze13fiihrung nicht, nur zum Teil oder nur in Raten aufbringen kann .... " § 114 
ZPO. 
137. KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG MIT GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ § 
115 ZPO, margin No. 56 (Hans-Joachim Musielak ed., 7th ed. 2009). 
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required. Eligibility depends on the difficulty of this individual 
applicant funding this particular case. Many people of low-to-
middle incomes qualify for legal aid and even people of high 
incomes who have high value claims or many personal expenses 
do. Today lawyers rightly tell potential clients that legal aid is "not 
just for the poor."138 They no longer call legal aid "Paupers' Law" 
(Armenrecht) , but "Litigation Cost Assistance" (Prozesskosten-
hilfe).139 
Case merit. Since the 1877 Code of Civil Procedure, 
applicants have had to show that their cases have merit. 140 Unlike 
the rule that prevailed in some states in Germany in 1877 (and in 
New York then),l4l the poor do not have to obtain from lawyers or 
officials prior endorsements of the validity of their claims. It is 
sufficient for them to present facts to judges, which, if true would 
support their claims. Judges make the determinations. Their 
review is typical of German civil proceedings generally, where the 
maxim prevails: "give me the facts, and I will give you your 
right." 142 
Review of the merits of claims protects the state treasury 
and the court from funding and conducting lawsuits with little 
chance of success. It protects potential opponents from lawsuits 
where the other side has diminished concern for costS.143 It also, 
however, saves applicants from their own misjudgments. Review 
138. See, e.g., G. KaB, "ProzeBkostenhilfe-nicht nur etwas fUr Arme" http://www.ra-
kassing.de/pkhlallg.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
139. Ct. Jiirg Rahmeda, Yom Armenrecht zur Proze/3kostenhilfe, [1979] JURISTISCHE 
RUNDSCHAU [JR] 492. 
140. At first blush, such a review might seem to contradict the constitutional prem-
ise that the poor should have the same access to courts as the prosperous. The rich are 
allowed to bring pointless lawsuits. Should not also the less well-off? The constitution-
al command does not, however, go so far. Poor and rich do not have to be treated exact-
ly the same; it is enough that all are on the same plane. See Philippi, supra note 29, at 
268. The court's review for prospects of success in effect puts the less well-off on the 
same plane as wealthy litigants who "reasonably" take into account process risks. 
KALTHOENER, supra note 104, at 147. 
141. See 1 HAHN, DIE GESAMTEN MATERIALIEN ZUR CIVILPROZEJ30RDNUNG UNO OEM 
EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ ZU DERSELBEN VOM 30. JANUAR 1877. AUF VERANLASSUNG DES 
KAISERLICHEN REICHS-JUSTIZAMTES 207 (1880) (for Germany), 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. 
Chap. VIII, Title 1, § 2(2) at 445 (1829). 
142. MAXEINER ET AL, supra note 73, at 105. 
143. STEIN/JONAS, supra note 135, at 724, margin No. 21. 
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prevents at least some foolish lawsuits, where if lost, aid recipients 
would have to pay the winning parties' costs. 144 
The arguable merit criterion in its present formulation 
predates the 1980 Reform.l45 It directs that legal aid is to be 
granted if "the intended action or defense offers a sufficient 
prospect of success and does not appear to be capricious."146 The 
courts have construed this formulation in favor of applicants. It 
does not require that applicants show probability of success. 147 It is 
satisfied that they raise claims or defenses that are "reasonably 
arguable' (vertretbar).148 Reviews are summary; they are not to 
place excessive demands on the showing. 149 The decision granting 
legal aid is intended to make legal process available; it should not 
substitute as an early decision of the case. 150 If the claim is 
dependent on resolution of a disputed question of law, the court 
should authorize legal aid so that the applicant can present the 
issue fully.151 It is constitutionally impermissible for the court to 
decide that question in the application. 152 Similarly, if the claim is 
dependent on credibility of admissible testimony, then the court 
should authorize aid. 153 
German courts have an eaSIer time reviewing legal aid 
144. Cf. BECK'SCHE RICHTER HAND-BuCH, at A I, page 6, margin No. 13 (2nd ed. 
1999) (citing Klaus Dresenkamp, ProzefJkostenhilfe). 
145. The 1980 Reform deleted the example of capriciousness that was previously in-
cluded in § 114 ZPO. 
146. § 114 ZPO. 
147. STEIN/JONAS, supra note 135, at 724, margin No. 22; KALTHOENER, supra note 
104, at 147, margin No. 409. 
148. Id. at 724, margin No. 22. The standard is reminiscent of language in Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
149. KALTHOENER, supra note 104, at 148, margin No. 410. 
150. Id. at 724. Taking evidence of witness and experts is foreclosed. § 118 II ZPO. 
151. See KALTHOENER, supra note 104, at 148-49, margin No. 411-12. 
152. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Deci-
sion of April 7, 2000, 1 BvR 81100, available at http://www.bundesver fas-
sungsgericht.de/entscheidungenlrk20000407_1bvr008100.htm1. 
153. See KALTHOENER at 149-50, margin No. 413·14. A generous application of the 
standard is practically compelled in German ordinary courts of first instance of gen-
eral jurisdiction (the Landgerichte), where representation by lawyers is compulsory. 
To deny legal aid in those courts can be tantamount to denying the right to be heard. 
C{. id. at 148, margin No. 409. 
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applications for prospects of success than would American courts. 
German pleadings are fuller than are American pleadings and are 
automatically reviewed by the courts in every case including those 
where there is no application for legal aid. In many legal aid cases, 
applications are made by lawyers and include draft complaints or 
answers. German pleadings are required to set out the facts of the 
case in detail and to identify the evidence that proof of the 
complaints will rely on. 154 
Success refers to legal success in asserting the claim. Thus, 
the determination of prospects for success is unaffected by a 
finding that judgment could not be enforced. Whether a claim is 
practically worth bringing is not a factor under review of the 
claim's prospects for success, but can be the basis for 
disqualification on the ground that the claim appears to be 
brought "capriciously" (mutwillig).155 The principal test of 
capriciousness is whether a person who did not require legal aid 
would bring it.156 For example, a claim is brought capriciously if it 
is brought for the full amount, when the debtor would voluntarily 
pay all but a part. 157 Legal aid, it is said, is not intended to allow 
needy persons to bring lawsuits that well-off people would not 
bring. 158 
Appeals. Each court determines eligibility for its own 
proceedings. If a party appeals a case, the party must make a 
separate application for legal aid for the appeal to the appellate 
court.159 The appellate court determines for itself whether legal aid 
criteria are met. 
2. PROCEDURE 
How deciders decide. The application proceeding is between 
154. See MAXEINER ET AL, supra note 73, at 105-07. 
155. KALTHoENER, supra note 104, at 152; 1 MUNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUR 
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, § 114, at 843, margin No. 65, 849, margin No. 87 (Thomas 
Rauscher, Peter Wax & Joachimi Wenzel eds., 3rd ed. 2008). 
156. It was explicitly defined in the law as it stood in 1980. Supra note 137, § 114, at 
512, margin No. 30 (citing the legislative history and a recent case). 
157. GOTTWALD, supra note 98, § 87 III. 3, at 470, margin No. 34. 
158. Supra note 137, § 114, at 512, margin No. 30. 
159. § 119(1) ZPO. 
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the applicant and the state. It is separate from the litigation, hut it 
is conducted by the judge in the litigation. 160 It is a simplified 
proceeding. The party seeking legal aid, even in a court that 
requires attorney representation, need not use an attorney. The 
examination of the application is summary;161 there is no hearing. 
The proceeding is to be expedited. l62 
Legal aid presents some possibility for tactical maneuvering 
in lawsuits. German lawyers can test the strength of their cases 
with judges by first filing for legal aid. l63 There is no cost risk 
associated with denial of an application for aid.l64 German lawyers 
do not seem to be concerned, as their American counterparts might 
be, that such applications disclose too much of their case too soon 
to the other side. 
Applicants need not apply in writing; they may apply orally 
to a court clerk, who records it in writing. 165 The application is to 
include a statement of the matter in dispute, the expected proof, 
and a personal statement of income and property of the applicant 
together with appropriate documentation. 166 The former is to show 
the arguable merit of the lawsuit; the latter is to show the 
personal need of the applicant. 
Even with prescribed forms and court clerk assistance in 
filling them out, applying for legal aid can be challenging. The two-
page financial form looks something like an American federal tax 
form and can create similar problems. 167 A leading legal aid 
160. §§ 118, 127(1) ZPO. 
161. SCHOREIT/GROJ3, supra note 104, §114, at 128, margin No. 36. 
162. GOTTWALD, supra note 98, § 87, at 474, margin No. 49; SCHoREIT/GROll, supra 
note 104, § 114, at 128, margin No. 36. 
163. Dresenkamp, supra note 144, at 4, margin No.5. 
164. § 118(1) ZPO; SCHOREIT/GROf3, supra note 104, § 118, at 201·203, margin No. 
34-45. 
165. § 117(1) ZPO. 
166. § 117(1) (2) ZPO. 
167. The form is available at the common website for the state and federal minis-
tries of justice, Justizportal des Bundes und der Uinder, 
http://www.justiz.de/index.php. under Formulare, first listing, Anlage zum All-trag auf 
Bewilligung der Prozesskostenhilfe. The form requires: 
(a) Applicant's name, address, occupation, personal information and 
the name of the legal representative. 
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textbook for practitioners devotes ten pages to explaining entering 
income, fourteen pages to subtractions from income and five pages 
to applying the table to the result. 168 And that does not yet take 
into account applicants' assets. It is no wonder that the authorities 
welcome lawyers filling out the forms for prospective legal aid 
clients. Where a lawyer makes the application for the applicant, 
typically the lawyer establishes the merit of the case using a 
complaint drafted for its eventual filing. 169 
In routine cases applicants present completed "Declarations 
of personal and financial circumstances" 170 with supporting 
documentation. The information provided determines how much 
money applicants are deemed to have available to meet litigation 
expenses. A table prescribed in the law determines how much of 
available resources the applicant must devote monthly to the 
lawsuit. The courts are said to apply these provisions generously 
to the benefit of applicants.171 
(b) Declaration whether legal insurance or other person (e.g., labor 
union) covers the costs. 
(c) Whether the applicant receives support from parent, separated 
or divorced spouse, or other person. 
(d) Applicant's dependents and the incomes of dependents. 
(e) Gross income of applicant and spouse in seven categories (em-
ployment, self-employment, rental, stock, social payments for chil-
dren, social payment for housing, and other). 
(f) Deductions of applicant and spouse for taxes, social insurance, 
other insurance and business expenses. 
(g) Statement or property in five categories (real estate, building 
fund, bank accounts, vehicles and other). 
(h) Residence size and expenses, including rent or mortgage pay· 
ments and heating costs. 
(i) Other payment expenses. 
G) Special burdens (e.g., physical disability expenses). 
168. KALTHOENER, supra note 104, at 74-84,84-98, and 98·103. 
169. GOTTWALD, supra note 98, § 87, at 473, margin No. 43; SCHOREIT/GROI3, supra 
note 104, §117, at 188-89, margin No.6. 
170. Erkliirung uber die personlischen und wirtschaftlichen Verhiiltnisse. The Code 
of Procedure authorizes the Federal Ministry of Justice to issue such forms for use in 
all states. § 117(c) ZPO. The forms adopted require approval of the upper house of the 
legislature (where states are represented). Use of issued forms is mandatory. § 177(d) 
ZPO. 
171. KALTHOENER, supra note 104, at 72. 
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Court costs and lawyers' fees are readily projected once the 
amount in dispute is known. In any event, however, because legal 
aid in principle is extended as an advance and not as an outright 
grant, the exact amount of expenses to be incurred rarely 
determines the decision to authorize legal aid. The precise costs 
and lawyers' fees are set in a final judgment.172 The Federal 
Ministry of Justice is authorized to, and has, issued regulations 
and forms to simplify the application. 173 
Right to be heard. Although courts are to consider 
application in expedited proceedings, they must provide applicants 
and the financing state authorities, with their right to be heard. 
The court can require that applicants provide support for factual 
claims. Courts are to consider the likelihood of success and the 
possibility of bad faith, but their reviews are not to supersede 
actual lawsuits. Normally courts do not hold hearings and usually 
do not call witnesses to determine eligibility. They are to reserve 
all disputed issues of fact and law for regular proceedings. 174 When 
courts deny legal assistance, they must provide written 
explanations for denial. 175 
Adversary's right to be heard. Strictly speaking the 
application for legal aid is a matter between applicant and the 
state, but the other party to the lawsuit has a practical interest in 
the outcome of that decision. If legal aid is granted, the recipient 
will be enabled better to conduct the lawsuit. There is risk that the 
very legal aid that the state provides to assure that the recipient is 
not disadvantaged ("equality of arms" - Waffengleichheit) , gives 
the recipient an advantage. For as long as German law has 
recognized the need to provide equality of arms, German jurists 
have worried that legal aid will disadvantage the other side. 176 To 
fend off such a result, the legal aid law gives the other side an 
opportunity to be heard on the granting oflegal aid. 177 
172. See §§ 91 et seq. ZPO. 
173. § 117(3) ZPO. 
174. This paragraph follows GOTTWALD, supra note 98, § 87, at 474·75, margin No. 
49·53. 
175. § 127(1) ZPO. 
176. See Linde, supra note 29. 
177. § 118(1) ZPO. Besides the obvious vexation of lawsuits, another concern of al· 
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The other side does not become a party to the application 
proceeding and is not served with the applicant's application. The 
other side is, however, informed of the application, is provided 
with a copy of that portion of the application related to the claim, 
and is given an opportunity to take a position on whether the 
underling claim has a sufficient prospect for success and is not 
made capriciously. On privacy grounds, the other side is not given 
a copy of the needs-side of the application and is not permitted to 
comment on the applicant's need for assistance. 178 
3. EXTENT OF LEGAL AID 
Determining the extent of legal aid is usually simple and 
formulaic since it is integrated into the cost system as a whole. Fee 
tables determine reimbursable court costs and lawyers' fees in all 
casesY9 Legal aid modifies the amounts and procedures 
somewhat, but remains anchored in the general cost law. 
The German legal system provides for judicial control of 
evidence-taking, fee limitation and shifting of costs to losing 
parties and thus avoids many opportunities for misuse of legal aid 
that may arise in the American system. 
Judicial control of evidence-taking largely precludes one side 
from imposing on adversaries costs of testimony that do not relate 
directly to the case under consideration. Fee regulation maintains 
proportion between case investment and case outcomes. Fee-
shifting substantially reduces opportunities for aided parties to 
gain advantages over unaided parties. 
The authorization of legal aid transfers permanently the 
aided party's obligations for future court costs, lawyers' fees and 
other expenses to the state treasury and for past such debts to the 
extent that they have not already been paid. The aided party is 
also excused from providing security for subsequent costs. The 
appointed lawyer is prohibited from making claims for fees against 
lowing parties to proceed with weak claims relying on legal aid is that they will be un· 
able to satisfy judgments for costs and fees when they lose. 
178. Dresenkamp, supra note 144, at 5, margin No.9. 
179. See generally RVG passim. 
2011] Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law 97 
the aided party. 180 Expenses are determined in the litigation. They 
include the travel costs of the aided party in attending court. 181 
Successful applicants ordinarily are obligated to make forty-
eight monthly co-payments beginning immediately. The size of the 
monthly co-payment depends on their ability to pay and not on 
costs, lawyer's fees and expenses of the lawsuit to be incurred. 
Courts rely on data submitted by applicants to determine how 
much money applicants have available. Should they find that 
applicants have no ability to co-fund lawsuits, i.e., less than €15 a 
month (about $20), they are to direct legal aid without co-
payments. If the amount available is above €15 monthly, 
applicants must make monthly co-payments. 182 The amount of the 
monthly co-payments are determined by the amounts available 
and not by the amounts of the anticipated expenses. So long as 
the available amount is below €750, the required payments are in 
the range of about 30 to 40% of the amount available. Above an 
available amount of €750, the required payment is €300 plus the 
entire amount available above €750. 183 
Recipients obligated to make monthly payments must 
continue to make the payments until they have paid all costs, fees 
and expenses or until they have made forty-eight payments, or 
until they are excused on further application. The state absorbs 
costs, lawyers' fees and expenses in excess of forty-eight 
payments. 184 
The monthly payment system brings more predictability and 
consistency to legal aid decisions than had existed before. It 
regularizes determination of need. In most instances there is no 
need to apply an indefinite standard. It also moderates the 
consequences of eligibility decisions. Errors in decisions do not 
have the dire consequence of precluding participation altogether, 
but only result in somewhat higher (or lower) monthly co-
180. § 122(1) ZPO. 
181. GO'ITWALD, supra note 98, at 475, margin No. 59. 
182. If projected litigation expenses would be less than four co-payments, legal aid is 
not available_ 
183. § 115 ZPO. 
184. See §§ 115, 122 ZPO. 
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payments. The monthly payment system makes many grants of 
legal aid self-funding. Better off recipients pay in full for the 
assistance they receive. Consequently the state can assist more 
applicants with the same funds. Less well-off recipients, including 
those making monthly payments, are still better off than they 
were under the old system, for under the old system, once the 
lawsuit concluded, they were required to repay all of the aid as 
soon as a court found that they were financially able to do SO.185 
Applicants receive financial support rather than a lawyer as 
such. In cases where lawyer representation is mandatory (mostly 
cases in the courts of general jurisdiction, Landgerichte, where the 
jurisdictional minimum is €5000), the court automatically appoints 
a lawyer (of the party's choosing.)l86 In cases where lawyer 
representation is not mandatory, in small claims courts and in 
some specialized courts, if the applicant requests a lawyer, the 
court will appoint a lawyer (and then of the party's choosing) 
either, if the circumstances of the case (i.e., complexity of claims, 
abilities of applicant) make a lawyer necessary or if the opposing 
party is represented by a lawyer. 187 The former serves the interest 
of justice; the latter assures the "equality of arms" between the 
disputing parties. 188 
IV. AN HISTORICAL EXPLANATION FOR DIFFERENCES 
Today there is a right to legal aid in Germany. There is none 
in the United States. Why? 
History suggests an explanation: German civil justice is the 
product of public ministers while American civil justice is the 
product of private lawyers. 189 The former responded to the needs of 
185. See generally BERNHARD MEIER, HAT SICH DIE PROZE13KOSTENHILFENOVELLE 
BEWAHRT. 
186. § 121(1) ZPO. 
187. § 121(2) ZPO. 
188. See GOTTWALD, supra note 98, at 475-76, margin No. 60-63. 
189. Compare YOM REICHSJUSTIZAMT ZUM BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ: ZUM 
100JAHRIGEN GRUNDUNGSTAG DES REICHSJUSTlZAMTES (1977), with BENJAMIN H. 
BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2010). For the 
development of the German Federal Ministry of Justice, see YOM REICHSJUSTIZAMT 
ZUM BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ: ZUM 100JAHRIGEN GRUNDUNGSTAG DES 
REICHSJUSTlZAMTES (1977). For the lawyer domination of the U.S. system, see 
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the public; the latter answered the calls of their principals, minded 
their own needs and ignored the needs of those who could not 
pay. 190 A brief glance at the history of legal aid in both countries 
confirms the conclusion. 
In the early nineteenth century conditions for legal aid in 
the United States and in Germany were similar.l91 In those days 
much dispute resolution was conducted without close attention to 
formal legal texts and without formal procedures. In informal 
courts and in other venues parties represented themselves. 
Lawyers were not common; public support for representation was 
unheard of. Only a few courts used lawyers. 192 Those courts that 
did, both in the United States and in Germany, made provision for 
the very poor in similar ways: exemption from court and lawyers' 
fees. They appointed lawyers to represent paupers for free and 
considered the free representation within the duties of lawyers as 
officers of the court.193 In the United States this charity was 
known as proceeding in forma pauperis; in Germany it was called 
BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
(2010). 
190. There is no cynicism in this remark. Both followed the roles assigned by their 
respective professions. Suggestive of this conclusion is in the U.S. we debate court-
provided counsel; abroad one debates access to justice. 
191. For the American scene, see generally ANTON-HEERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA (2 vols. 1965); 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAw 68 (2009); GERARD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS 1760-1840 (1979). For the 
German scene, see generally KENNETH F. LEDFORD, FROM GENERAL ESTATES TO 
SPECIAL INTEREST: GERMAN LAWYERS 1878-1933, 25-58 (1996); ERICH D6HRING, 
GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCH EN RECHTSPFLEGE SEIT 1500 (1953). For a comparative his-
torical introduction with particular reference to right versus charity, see Mauro Cap-
pelletti & James Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations: Part One: The 
Emergence of a Modern Theme, 24 STAN. L. REV. 347, 357-64 (1972). 
German states imposed limitations on the number of lawyers. Prussia even tried to 
ban lawyers altogether and replace them with state officials_ See LEDFORD, supra note 
191, at 22-58. 
193. The reformer Field rejected this characterization as office of the court. David 
Dudley Field's letter was printed as Appendix to the report of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, in relation to the more simple and speedy administration of justice. 5 
DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK SIXTY-FOURTH [SIC, 65TH] 
SESSION (1842) (citing STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT IN PART OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
THE JUDICIARY, IN RELATION TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, DOCUMENT No. 81, 
55 (1842»; FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, CODE 
OF PROCEDURE 205 (1848). 
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Paupers' Law (Armenrecht). Today we would call it mandatory pro 
bono. 
The nineteenth century brought enormous growth in 
commerce and industry in both the United States and Germany. 
Local economies became national ones. Rural societies became 
urban mass societies. Collections of states became nations. 
Demand for formal law, legal procedures and legal services grew 
exponentially. Responses were similar: more statutes to be applied 
in more rational and more effectively formal procedures; thus, the 
results were different. Particularly they were different for legal 
aid. 
In Germany, the government had and has the leading role in 
providing courts and administering justice. The government had 
and has responsibility for maintaining a well-functioning society. 
Such a society is furthered by an effective rule-of-Iaw that strives 
for social justice. 194 The government has control of tax revenues; it 
has power and authority to direct payments for legal aid to the 
poor. 
In the United States, on the other hand, lawyers and judges 
are responsible for the courts. They do not have responsibility for 
administration of civil justice generally or for society as a whole. 
Their responsibilities are to their clients or, in the case of courts, 
to the parties that appear before them. Judges and lawyers do not 
control tax revenues. Judges do not without controversy direct 
government to spend public funds to improve courts or to pay 
lawyers' fees. Judges, who come from the practicing bar, do not 
without resistance from their former colleagues, direct lawyers to 
represent the poor for free. 
Access to justice today in these two countries reflects those 
different conditions. In Germany it is understood that access to 
justice should be universal. Access is extended as a right to all-
not just to the poor-when needed. In the United States, on the 
other hand, access to justice extends only to those who can pay the 
price of admission or who are lucky enough to receive charity. 
194. See Grundgestez [GG] [Basic Law = Constitution] Art. 20(1) (establishing that 
"[t]he Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state"). 
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Public support for litigation as a right remains unknown in civil 
matters. 
A. UNITED STATES 
In the first century of America's independence lawyers and 
judges took control of state legal systems from state legislatures. 195 
They made sure that they could operate free of government 
regulation and mandatory pro bono work.l96 In the years since, 
although the bar has gone national, it has not addressed access to 
justice systematically. Its national organizations have sought 
many improvements, but making access to justice universal has 
not been among them. Bench and bar have forgotten the 
declarations of 1776. They have left the public to look out for itself. 
The result of their inaction on access to justice is an unsystematic 
mix of legal aid societies, contingent fee cases and self-
representation in small claims and other courts. That mix leaves 
most of the needs of most people-including those of the poor-
unsatisfied. 197 
1. IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
Here we assert an historical explanation grounded in 
experiences in New York. We hypothesize that the situation for 
access to justice in other states was largely similar or worse than 
in New York. That is a reasonable hypothesis. New York 
historically has been among the leading states in civil justice and 
in legal aid. New York's legislature in 1801 was an early adopter of 
in forma pauperis proceedings.198 Only about half of the states 
followed suit. 199 
195. See 2 CHROUST, supra note 191, Chapter V "Legislative and Judicial Attempts 
to Control the Legal Profession." 
196. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Recovery, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 9 (1984). 
197. See DILLER & SAVNER, supra note 103 (estimating for the poor 80%). 
198. See LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1st Vol. 1802). (Chap. XC. An ACT for 
the Amendment of Law, and the better Advancement of Justice, passed March 30th, 
1801). . 
199. NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW: WITH 
OCCASIONAL NOTES AND COMMENTS 250 (7th Vol. 1824). A century later, about half of 
the states had no such procedure. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litiga-
tion, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 389-90 (1923). 
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Under New York's statutes judges and lawyers showed a 
Dickensian solicitude to applicants. In an 1828 decision New 
York's chancellor ruled, "the court must be convinced that the 
party is really an object of charity before it will grant him this 
privilege."200 The chancellor stood up for his colleagues rights to 
their fees: "Applications of this kind are not to be encouraged in 
this state, where every healthy and industrious citizen can earn 
sufficient to support himself, and also to enable him to pay the 
moderate fees of the officers of this court."201 
To make matters worse, although the New York statute did 
not require it, the state's judges followed English practice and 
required that applicants be destitute: they could be worth no more 
than five pounds sterling, excluding only their wearing apparel 
and the subject of the controversy. 202 
The 1828 New York Revised Statutes-generally a forward 
looking work-wrote the English needs test into law: applicants 
could be worth no more in American currency than twenty dollars. 
With miserly generosity the Revised Statutes provided that 
applicants might exclude the value not only of the clothes on their 
backs, but the wearing apparel of their family as well as "furniture 
necessary for them."203 If that were not restrictive enough, the 
Revised Statutes added a case merit test that the socially-
unconnected poor could not be expected to meet: they had to 
present a certification from a lawyer that he had examined their 
application and had found a good claim if the facts alleged were 
true. 204 
Contemporary commentary confirms that judges interpreted 
already miserly provisions with stinginess. 205 They denied in 
200. Isnard v. Cazeaux, 1 Paige 39, 40 (N.Y. Chancery 1828). 
201. DAVID GRAHAM, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK 748·49 (1832); 915·16 (2nd ed. 1836) (quoting id.). 
202. 1 JOHN DUNLAP, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW YORK IN CIVIL ACTIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE PROCEEDINGS IN ERROR 35 (1821). 
The New Jersey Supreme Court opined that "five pounds sterling may be too small a 
sum, but there should be some limit." Sears v. Tindall, 15 N.J.L. 399, 403 (N.J. 1836). 
203. N.Y. Rev. state. tit. 1, 2 (1829). 
204.Id. 
205. See 2 ALEXANDER MANSFIELD BURRILL, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE 
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forma pauperis status to whole classes of parties, including 
defendants, appellants and appellees, and plaintiffs who brought 
slander and other "vexatious" actions. 206 On the ground of abuse 
prevention, they assigned lawyers to in forma pauperis cases 
lawyers different than those who prepared the applications.207 
Small wonder that in 1885 one observer described in forma 
pauperis in N ew York as an "almost forgotten practice."208 
2. ABSENCE OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE FROM 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS 
The 1848 Code of Civil Procedure for New York, among the 
most significant reforms of American civil procedure ever, made no 
provision for the poor. It left unchanged and outside the code the 
in forma pauperis proceedings of the Revised Statutes. 209 While it 
ignored the interests of the poor, it minded those of lawyers: it 
abolished all laws "establishing or regulating" 'lawyers' fees. 210 
By the 1870s, the legal profession was going nationa}.211 
Lawyers sought national responses to the needs of the modern era. 
Yet they left access to justice out of their national reform 
proposals. We tick off here some of the record of omission: 
In 1878 reform-minded lawyers founded the 
American Bar Association. Not until forty years 
later did the Association address the issue of legal 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW· YORK WITH AN APPENDIX OF PRACTICAL 
FORMS 105 (2nd ed. 1846); see also AUSTIN ABBOTT, THE PRINCIPLES AND FORMS OF 
PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTION IN COURTS OF RECORD UNDER THE CODE OF PROCEDURE 
569 (1887). 
206. See id. (citing cases). The United States Supreme Court similarly construed 
strictly the federal statute and held that it gave neither right to proceed on appeal in 
forma pauperis nor the authority for the court to grant the status. Bradford v. S. Ry. 
Co., 195 U.S. 243 (1904). 
207. Harris v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 13 N.Y.S. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1891). 
208. LT. Williams, Cheap Justice [Letter], 31 ALB. L.J. 199 (1885). 
209. Not until 1879 did they come into the code as part of the reform that Field 
dreaded, the Throop code. That allowed that defendants might be granted in forma 
pauperis status. 
210. See James R. Maxeiner, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure, 58 AM. J. 
COMPo L. SUPP. 195,218·19 (2010). See also, Maxeiner, supra note 73. 
211. E.g., the American Bar Association, the first national bar association, was 
founded in 1878. 
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aid. 212 
In 1892 commercially-sensitive lawyers established 
the National Conference of Commissioners of 
Uniform State Laws, now known as the Uniform 
Laws Commission. It quickly proposed a Uniform 
Sales Act, but in 120 years it has yet to propose an 
access to justice act. The closest that it has come is 
the Model Public Defender Act for use in criminal 
justice. 213 
In 1913 progressive lawyers founded the American 
Judicature Society to work for better courts. 
Although it has campaigned vigorously for non-
political judicial selection, it has not found room in 
its program to promote civil legal aid for the poor.214 
In 1923 reform-minded lawyers led by like-minded 
judges and academics, established the American 
Law Institute. 215 Not until 2009 did a representative 
of a legal aid society address the Institute. 216 None 
212. In 1921 its first committee report on the topic lamented that for forty years the 
ABA and legal aid societies "have existed side by side, without contact, without mutu-
al recognition, and without joining hands." Report of the Special Committee on Legal 
Aid Work, 46 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 493, 494 (1921). The 
Committee observed that "there is a direct responsibility both civic and professional, 
on members of the bar to see to it that no person with a righteous cause is unable to 
have his day in court because of his inability to pay for the services of counsel." Id. at 
493. A few years later a successor committee proposed a legal aid act. See First Draft 
of a Poor Litigant's Statute, 49 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 386 
(1924), reprinted in REGINALD HEBER SMITH & JOHN S. BRADWAY WITH PREFACE BY 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, GROWTH OF LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 106 
(1926). A second draft followed a dozen years later and was considered in the Califor-
nia legislature as recently as 1940. 
213. See generally WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A 
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1991). 
214. See generally MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY (1992). 
215. See generally THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 
1923-1998 (1998), Kristen Davis Adams, The American Law Institute: Justice 
Cardozo /s Ministry of Justice? 32 S. ILL. L. REV. 173 (2007). 
216. Posting of Kristen D. Adams to 86th Annual Meeting Annual Meeting Blog [of 
the American Law Institute] http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=meetings 
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of its model acts or restatements provides for access 
to civil justice. 
In 1938 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
bar accomplished the most important reform since 
the 1848 New York code.217 In the Federal Rules it 
achieved a long sought goal: judicial and not 
legislative control of civil procedure. 218 The Federal 
Rules make no provision for access to justice. I am 
aware of no proposal to incorporate access to justice 
into the Rules. 219 
105 
3. ECLECTIC SUBSTITUTES FOR SYSTEMIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
The nation could no longer tolerate the bar's indifference to 
access to justice. The public, individual lawyers and politicians 
responded to system of inaction as best as they could with legal aid 
societies, contingent fee representation, and self-representation 
(mostly in small claims courts). These advocates of access to justice 
have helped many, but only a small portion of all of those in need. 
Legal aid societies. In 1876 German immigrants founded the 
nation's first and to this day leading legal aid society, now known 
as the Legal Aid Society of New York. The idea of a legal aid 
society is that the organization furnishes to needy applicants a 
lawyer typically paid a salary by the society. These privately 
funded societies began to have some wide successes in the first 
third of the twentieth century only to fall victim to the economic 
depression of the 1930s. 22o 
.annual_blog&startrow=21 (May 19, 2009, 2:33 PM). 
217. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS: CELEBRATING ONE HUNDRED YEARS 
OF LEGAL REFORM 55 (1949). 
218. See THOMAS W. SHELTON, SPIRIT OF THE COURTS (1918). 
219. The organized bar might defend this failure with the assertion that such revi· 
sion would be beyond the scope of "civil procedure" governed by the enabling act. See 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934,42 Stat. 1064,28 U.S.C. §2072. 
220. The history of legal aid is well documented. For 1876 to the 1960s, see generally 
Emery A. Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States (1951); Stephen K. Huber, Thou 
Shalt Not Ration Justice: A History and Bibliography of Legal Aid in America, 44 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 754 1976; LEGAL AID WORK (John S. Bradway & Reginald Heber 
Smith, eds., THE ANNALS vol. 124, March, 1926); HARRISON TWEED, THE LEGAL AID 
SOCIETY NEW YORK CITY 1876 - 1951 (1954); JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, THE 
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In the 1960s the war on poverty campaign of President 
Johnson revived legal aid societies through infusions of public 
funds. These publically-funded legal aid organizations also enjoyed 
success, but became the subject of political controversy. They faced 
a difficult challenge. Litigation costs are high and legal aid society 
funding was low. They had to choose among the cases they 
brought. They choose those that offered what they saw as proving 
the largest benefits for the lowest costs. However, unfortunately 
these were cases intended to create precedents of wide-ranging 
application. These cases entrenched interests. 221 
Contingent fee litigation. Abolition of fee regulation made 
new forms of client contracts possible. The most celebrated-and 
the most criticized-is the contingent fee arrangement. These 
private contracts contribute to court access by allowing lawyers to 
agree to take their fees from their clients' winnings and to forego 
fees if their clients lose. Contingent fee contracts became common 
in the third quarter of the nineteenth century.222 They were and 
are controversial because they invest lawyers with interest in the 
outcomes of the suits they bring. The fear is that contingent fee 
lawyers are guided by their own interests and not by those of 
justice. Although contingent fee arrangements are promoted as a 
means of providing court access, they are an imperfect one at best. 
They take from victorious plaintiffs a substantial portion of their 
award. 223 They are practically available only to plaintiffs. They do 
LANCE OF JUSTICE: A SEMI-CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY 1876-
1926 (1928). 
221. In the 1960s federal funding became a feature of legal aid and has resulted in 
high levels of controversy surrounding it. See POVERTY LAw MANUAL FOR THE NEW 
LAWYER 18 (2002), available at http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-
library/research-guides/poverty-law-manuallindex.html; EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE 
AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 
(1974, reissued with new material, 1978); SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: 
THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1990); 
LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: TIME FOR REFORM (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1992). 
222. Compare EDWIN COUNTRYMAN, THE ETHICS OF COMPENSATION FOR 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE ALBANY LAw SCHOOL AND AN 
ANSWER TO HOSTILE CRITIQUES (1882), with LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: 
WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY COST AMERICA (2011). See generally Peter 
Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contin-
gency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1997). The controversy 
extends to class action claims. 
223. They thus encourage indeterminate legal claims. MAXEINER ET AL., supra note 
2011] Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law 107 
not extend aid as of right, but only in the discretion of lawyers who 
agree to take on cases. Lawyers take on cases where they observe 
sufficient prospects for their own success. 
Small claims courts. Small claims courts are the urban 
successors of the rural courts of justicEls of the peace. They are 
considered products of the Progressive movement of the early 
twentieth century. They were the public's way of providing access 
to courts for persons of limited means and without access to 
lawyers. 224 By their nature, they are available only up to a certain 
maximum amount in dispute-today, typically $5,000. 225 They 
often produce rough rather than legal justice in that procedures 
are informal and application of law approximate. 
B. GERMANY 
In Germany, government authorities had and have charge of 
administration of the courts and of admission of lawyers to 
practice. They have sought to realize the American promise that 
everyone "ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully 
without any denial.. .. "226 Provision of legal aid in civil matters has 
never been earnestly questioned III the modern era of 
representative democracy. 
1. LITIGATION AID BEFORE 1871 UNIFICATION 
Until 1871 Germany consisted of many independent states. 
Following the French Revolution of 1789 the larger and more 
progressive states introduced codes of civil procedure that moved 
away from older written procedures to newer oral hearings.227 
These codes recognized a new relationship of government and 
citizen different from the old relationship of ruler and subject. 
They started to move legal aid from a basis of solicitude for the 
73, at 34-35. 
224. See generally Eric H. Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 
293 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. (1981). 
225. See generally EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951) 
226. Supra note 3. 
227. See generally EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, 103, 107-12 (C.H. 
van Rhee ed., 2005). 
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poor to a right of citizens in states based on the rule of law. 228 
Already early in the nineteenth century some German states 
responded to popular calls for rule of law based legal systems. 
Some recognized that the rule of law requires equal access to 
justice. Perhaps they saw institutional self-interest in more 
responsive government. They moved to make legal aid an integral 
part of the system of civil justice. To deal with the popular 
demands for rule of law, they included legal aid in the codes of civil 
procedure that they drafted to deal with the popular demands for 
rule oflaw. They required that lawyers, as a condition for practice, 
provide legal services for free to needy litigants. 
When the legislature adopted a code of civil procedure for 
the whole country in 1877, legal aid for poor citizens was already a 
well-established principle. The report explaining the 1877 Code of 
Civil Procedure justified the principle in a single sentence: "The 
exemption of poor litigants from lawyers' fees and costs follows 
from the necessity of equal protection under law for poor and 
rich."229 The principle has never come in for serious questioning. 230 
228. See TROCKER, supra note 108, at B7-BlO. 
229. "Die Befreiung armer ProzeBpartien von den Kosten folgt aus der 
Nothwendigkeit gleichen Rechtsschutzes fUr Arm und Reich." 1 HAHN, DIE GESAMTEN 
MATERIALIEN ZUR CIVILPROZEflORDNUNG UND DEM EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ ZU 
DERSELBEN YOM 30. JANUAR 1877. AUF VERANLASSUNG DES KAISERLICHEN REICHS-
JUSTIZAMTES 206 (1880). 
230. Even the Nazi Dictatorship, despite its perversion of the legal system, only 
tightened up requirements for aid; it did not challenge the principle. See HANS 
HINRICH SCHROEDER-HoHENWARTH, DAS ARMENRECHT IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK UND 
SEINE REFORM UNTER BESONDERER BERUCKSICHTIGUNG WIRTSCHAFTLICHER UND 
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER ASPEKTE [THE POOR LAw OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY AND 1ST REFORM WIRTH PARTICULATE REFERENCE TO COMMERCIAL AND 
COMPARATIVE ASPECTS] 14-15 (1976). Refugees from Nazi Germany who reached 
America were bewildered that the Nazi regime provided legal protection that the 
United States did not. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees in 
the Great Society: In sorrow and in anger-and in hope, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966). 
Access to civil justice is anchored in the German constitutional order and now in that 
of Europe. In the 1950s the Federal Constitutional Court recognized the right as a 
principle of constitutional rank. See SCHROEDER-HoHENWARTH, at 15-16 (citing cases). 
The Constitutional Court rests its finding on constitutional guarantees of equal pro-
tection (Article 3(1», of the rule of law (Article 20(3», of access to courts (Article 19(4», 
and of the right to be heard (Article 103(1». Supra note 137, § 114 I 1. It also finds 
support for legal aid in the social state principle Article 20(1). See id. at § 114 I 2. 
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2. WIDENING AND DEEPENING LEGAL AID SINCE 1871 
In the 1870s Germany united in a federal state. It 
established a national ministry of justice to create federal laws 
and to supervise their implementation in member states. 231 A brief 
look at the ministry's activity since shows that often it has led 
making access to justice routine. It has moved the law to tailor 
decisions m individual cases more closely to individual 
circumstances. This is reflected in its positions on eligibility 
requirements and on its approaches to funding legal aid. 
Economic need. The state legal aid provisions that predated 
the 1877 Code had relied on extra-judicial institutions to make 
determinations of economic need. Needs were based on overall 
wealth and were not related to the proposed litigation as such. 
Applicants were required to present to the court a written 
certificate of an appropriate public authority which expressly 
certified the applicant's poverty on the basis of the party's 
profession and the taxes the party paid. The Code of 1877 provided 
for aid if the applicant was "unable to defray the costs of the 
litigation without jeopardy to the means necessary for his and his 
family's sustenance .... "232 In other words, already the 1877 Code 
looked more to the particular case than to the overall financial 
circumstances. It did not require obtaining a certificate from an 
external authority. Today, following the 1980 Reform, the Code is 
more generous still: an applicant is entitled to legal aid if 
"according to her personal and economic circumstances she cannot 
meet the costs of the litigation or only in part or m 
installments."233 
Case merit. The Ministry has largely advocated looser rather 
than stricter merit tests. The original draft of the Code of Civil 
231. See, e.g., HANS SCHULTE·NOLKE, DAS REICHSJUSTIZAMT UND DIE ENTSTEHUNG 
DES BURGERLICHEN GESETzBUCHS [The Imperial Justice Authority and the Creation 
ofthe Civil Code] (1995). 
232. Cappelletti, supra note 133, at 387-92. English translation of the relevant pro-
visions of the Code of Civil Procedure as in force in 1975, i.e., just before the adoption 
of the 1980 Reform Law. 
233. "[D]ie nach ihren personlichen und wirtschaftlichen Verhiiltnissen die Kosten 
der ProzeJ3fUhrung nicht, nur zum Teil oder nur in Raten aufbringen kann .... " § 114 
ZPO. 
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Procedure had no case merit test at alL It would have extended aid 
to all indigent. It was parliament that added in the first reading a 
case merit requirement. The plaintiff had to show that the claim 
was "not capricious or completely hopeless" (nicht mutwillig oder 
vollig aussichtslos). In the second reading parliament made that 
requirement stricter still by deleting "completely."234 
In 1931, in the depth of the Great Depression, the 
government by emergency decree made the requirement much 
harder to meet: the applicant had to show probability of success. 
When the decree went out of force a few years later, the Ministry 
of Justice advocated for return to the original language of 1877. It 
was unsuccessful: parliament adopted the present language 
reqUIrmg a "sufficient likelihood of success" (hinreichende 
Aussicht).235 
The courts gave the requirement of a "sufficient likelihood of 
success" a generous interpretation and have not relied on it to 
restrict granting legal aid. 236 Already they gave the original 1877 
provision a generous construction in favor of applicants: legal aid 
was to be authorized unless the hopelessness of the case was "clear 
on its face" (klar auf der Hand).237 As we have seen, all that 
"sufficient" requires is that from a legal standpoint, the legal 
position is "reasonably arguable" (vertretbar) and from a factual 
point, that evidence could be taken that would prove the necessary 
facts. 238 
Funding. The biggest changes in legal aid over the past 130 
years have been in funding. The original law placed the burden of 
legal aid principally on lawyers and secondarily on aid recipients. 
The court, upon being convinced that applications were well-
founded, ordered provisional relief from payment of costs, lawyers' 
fees and expenses. Applicants were theoretically required to repay 
234. Hahn Mat II, 554+986. RG interpretation did not follow. JAMES GOLDSCHMITI, 
DIE PROZEB ALS RECHTSLAGE, 293·94 n. 1512 (1925). 
235. SCHROEDER·HOHENWARTH, supra note 218, at 12·13. 
236. Id. at 14·15 (commenting that a description of the system would be incomplete 
without reference to case law). 
237. Id. at 15. 
238. STEIN/JONAS, supra note 135, 724·25, margin No. 22; GOTTWALD, supra note 
98, at 470, margin No. 32. 
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the amounts from which they were provisionally exempted as soon 
as they could do so without jeopardizing family sustenance. 239 In 
many cases, however, representation turned out to be mandatory 
pro bono work for lawyers. 
In 1919, coincident with the general impoverishment of the 
country following the First World War, the system went from this 
mandatory pro bono system to the system of state-funded 
representation described above. The 1980 Reform made a major 
change in the footing of the participation of aid recipients in their 
own relief. Where before recipients were provisionally freed from 
all costs, which at least in theory, they were required to repay in 
full when they could, today as described above, they are 
permanently freed from all costs, but immediately begin making 
forty-eight limited co-payments. This reform was designed to 
broaden and normalize legal aid. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The ABA Model Access Act is a long overdue forward step. 
More than two hundred years ago Americans called on the world 
to provide civil justice to all. Today, almost all European countries 
do. The United States, in not providing a right to aid in civil 
litigation, shares company with only two European countries: 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine. 240 
The Model Act substantively is an imperfect step, for it 
would be limited to "basic human needs." Justice for all knows no 
such bounds. 
The Model Act technically is an imperfect step because it 
leaves critical questions of litigation control and financing 
unanswered. 
The inevitable result both substantively and technically-
239. §125 ZPO (citing old version). See Cappelletti, supra note 133, at 391. 
240. CEPEJ, supra note 10, at 50. Even dictatorial Belarus, the only European state 
not a member of the Council of Europe, seems to provide such a right. See V ASILI 
KUHARCHYK, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN BELARUS 17-19 (April 2008), available at 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/36295. Mention is not made of non-European countries only 
because I know of no summary of legal aid there as convenient as that of CEPEJ for 
the Council of Europe countries. 
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were it actually adopted-will be a cacophony of disparate legal 
aid systems. 
In its own way, however, leaving so many critical questions 
open, creates the possibility of a new start for legal aid: 
introduction of a private attorney approach to legal aid. That could 
exist alongside the staff attorney approach. 241 
The experience of the past thirty-five years should not 
encourage blind adherence to past approaches of legal aid society 
representation. In the United States, with our staff attorney 
approach, legal aid is controversial and ill-funded. Litigation legal 
needs remain unmet. In Germany, on the other hand, with its 
private attorney approach, legal aid is accepted as a routine 
feature of the system of civil justice available to all in need and not 
just to the impoverished. Counseling needs now receive attention. 
Adoption of the Model Act presents an opportunity rare in 
contemporary comparative law: writing on an empty legislative 
slate. Today American legal aid is a matter of private charity and 
public appropriation. It has no legal form. Tomorrow, wherever the 
Model Act is adopted, legal aid will be a matter of right. Neither 
statutes or precedents, nor the Model Act itself, confine legal aid's 
future configuration. 
Common objections that frustrate comparative learning 
generally are not tenable in legal aid. On the one hand, the 
underlying values are the same: access to justice and equal 
protection under law. On the other hand, there are no existing 
legal structures that rule out applying foreign experiences. 
Legislatures can do what they like, subject only to 
accommodations necessary to incorporate legal aid into the overall 
legal system or changes in the overall system necessary to permit 
that. 
That cheery view, however, confronts political reality. It is 
hard to imagine a legislature today that could take up that 
challenge. It is only somewhat less hard to imagine a newly-
241. Already a generation ago, James Gordley posited that the best solution would 
be to have both. Gordley, supra note 81, at 226. 
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appointed State Access Board that would draw up such a plan. 
Where would it get funds and how would it obtain attorney buy-in? 
The cheery view, moreover, confronts a still more daunting 
obstacle: the failures of the existing system of civil procedure. The 
poor are not the only ones deprived of a well-functioning system of 
civil justice. We all are. We cannot provide legal aid to all, because 
we cannot provide access to justice even for those who are well-
off. 242 
Earnest consideration of the Model Act should lead people to 
seriously reconsider the American system of civil litigation 
generally. It is not enough to build on the past. We must start 
over. To start over demands new ideas. It may well demand new 
institutions. But start over we must if we are to remain true to our 
nation's ideals ofliberty and justice for all. 
242. See generally, MAXEINER ET. AL., supra note 73. 
